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NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICIES: LESSONS FOR THE EU AND THE CLEAN INDUSTRIAL DEAL

Case study: New industrial policy in the USA

Paolo Monteiro de Macedo (Independent Expert), Nicolas Berghmans, Céline Kauffmann, Philippine Lévy (IDDRI)

After the COVID-19 crisis, the Biden administration tried to take the opportunity of a large economic recovery package, the "Build Back Better" (BBB) law, to revive industrial policy in the USA. However, this comprehensive legislative pack including fiscal and structural reforms eventually failed in the Senate in December 2021. The Inflation Reduction Act adopted in August 2022 incorporated some of the fiscal measures included in the BBB and embodied the shift in the US economic policy towards a broad-base support for domestic manufacturing, mostly to foster economic security (especially against China), create new industrial jobs for the middle class and tackle climate change with incentive measures, as the political polarization in the USA never allowed the adoption of a carbon tax at the federal level. This large fiscal stimulus was provided in a specific political context that enabled the adoption of this ambitious support plan, which was passed as a "reconciliation bill", but was not structured in a well-defined, complete industrial strategy. Instead, it relies on generous production and investment tax credits, complemented by large private demand subsidies, which create a consistent framework for incentivizing industrial investments in manufacturing in the USA. The use of local content requirements in public procurement, through the "Build America, Buy America" condition in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and for public subsidies, especially the clean vehicle tax credit, was justified as a way to secure value chains. The objective to create a "good job" economy is also evidenced by the use of multiple social conditions and additional incentives for investing in deprived "brown-field" or "energy" communities. The new Trump administration is challenging the implementation of this industrial strategy and threatens long-term investments in clean energy manufacturing, as the environment becomes more hostile towards demand for clean technologies and the government takes action (such as cutting funds on climate change related research or bans in the development of offshore wind), putting into question the development of certain clean technologies in the USA.

This case study is related to the *Study* New industrial policies: Lessons for the EU and the Clean industrial Deal

Figure A.1 United States timeline



1. INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY – DIRECTION, PLANNING & GOVERNANCE

1.1. Political directionality of the national industrial strategy

There is not a single document summarizing the industrial strategy of the USA and its main objectives. During the Biden administration, the political reasoning underlying the turn towards industrial policy was rather presented in speeches that explained the consistency of new bills recently adopted.

First, Brian Deese, former National Economic Council Director, has supported in a speech, in April 2022, the necessity to pursue a "modern industrial strategy" to enhance American economic resilience and capacity strategy.[1] This strategy was further developed during a second speech, in October 2022, "Remarks on executing a Modern American Industrial Strategy".[2] This speech explains that Biden's industrial policy relies on four "foundational" laws: the American Rescue Plan (March 2021), the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (November 2021),[3] the CHIPS and Science Act (August 2022),[4] and the Inflation Reduction Act (August 2022).[5] The stated objectives of these different laws are significant investments in the country (expected $3.5 trillion of public and private investments over 10 years) for the "resurgence of American manufacturing", "reshoring of supply chains" and "strengthening of [the] industrial base" that should "reduce energy prices for families and created high-quality jobs for workers". This strategy should be implemented through long-term tax credits to provide enough visibility for economic actors and make demonstration project at scale, through building new infrastructures with speed up administrative proceedings, through a "fair" involvement of communities and a "strategic engagement" diplomacy to create an international coalition of "reliable partners" to reinforce supply chains.

The National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan also made a speech in April 2023 on "Renewing American Economic Leadership", focused on the international dimension of this industrial policy.[6] He stressed similar challenges justifying "unapologetically" the use of domestic industrial policy. The second point was the necessity to develop "new international economic partnership" beyond reducing tariffs. These partnerships must create

[1] Brian Deese (20 April, 2022): Remarks on a Modern American Industrial Strategy

[2] Brian Deese (13 October, 2022): Remarks on Executing a Modern American Industrial Strategy

[3] https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684

[4] https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346

[5] https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text

[6] Jake Sullivan (27 April, 2023): Remarks on Renewing American Economic Leadership

Figure A.2 United States indicators



*
Renewables include hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal, bioenergy, wave, and tidal, but not traditional biofuels.
Low-carbon energy is the sum of nuclear and renewable sources.

diversified and resilient supply chains, with the inclusion of social objectives (just clean energy transition, creating good jobs, ensuring trust, safety and openness of digital infrastructures, and stopping the race to bottom in corporate taxation).
These speeches happened after the voting of these laws, and we can question whether they provide an *ex post* rationality of this "industrial policy pack". Indeed, initially the Biden administration aimed to pass the "Build Back Better" Plan discussed in 2021 addressing both structural reforms and fiscal measures to support strategic sectors. This proposal was finally repealed in December 2021 because of insufficient support in the Senate. Only after this initial failure did political negotiation enable a majority at the Senate which supported the IRA in August 2022, which was passed as a "reconciliation bill".[7] The specificity of this political momentum has therefore largely impacted the content of the final bill.
In April 2025, Donald Trump declared in a speech 'jobs and factories will come roaring back into our country',[8] and promised the US would protect its industry and workers from global competitors. This vision of industry however excludes clean energy, particularly electric vehicles. The impact of this speech and of subsequent measures which were taken to attempt to freeze various IRA funding is yet to be fully evaluated, but it is likely to affect the dynamic of the clean tech sector.

1.2. Technological and environmental objectives of industrial policy

As a consequence of the specific institutional and political momentum of 2022, no single objective orients American industrial strategy. After the rejoining of the Paris agreement, the overarching objective was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50-52% by 2030 compared to 2005 level and to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Nonetheless, there are no specific decarbonization targets nor a definition of strategic technologies with development roadmaps defined at the federal level.
However, when taking office on 20 January, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order initiating the withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Agreement once again. It is thus unclear to which extent the USA will continue supporting environmental objectives.

1.3. Institutional setup supporting the implementation of the industrial policy

The main operator for all tax credits defined in the Inflation Reduction Act is the Department of Energy which has multiple agencies responsible for the management of different grants and subsidies: the Office of Clean Energy Demonstration is responsible for most of decarbonization grants, the office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy leads grants and tax credits related to the deployment of renewable energy facilities while the office of Manufacturing and

[7] Reconciliation bills are special American legislative vehicles that can be used only twice a year, which fasten the legislative process, requiring only a simple majority at the Senate. However, this type of law can only relate to tax, spending and debt measures; therefore, all the structural reforms initially planned in the Build Back Better Plan were discarded.

[8] ESG dive, (2025), Trump administration ordered to resume IRA funding, April 18th, 2025, https://www.esgdive.com/news/judge-orders-trump-reinstate-inflation-reduction-act-funding/745653/; Rhode Island Court. (2025) https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.59116/gov.uscourts.rid.59116.45.0.pdf

Energy Supply Chains manages tax credits related to the development of new manufacturing capacities. In practice, the role of the DoE for defining the guidance of these funds gave it determining weight in the definition of USA industrial policy.
There isn't however a clearly identified federal institution dedicated to the definition of an industrial strategy. This is consistent with the definition of simple and "hands-off" instruments through tax credits which require limited political guidance and rather rely on private initiative. Federated states may also play a more active role in the definition of state's industrial policy.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF A CARBON PRICING MECHANISM

There is no federal carbon tax despite multiple legislated attempts to propose such a tax. Currently, 12 states (that make up 30% of US GDP) have different active carbon-pricing programs (California, Washington, and the eleven Northeast states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont). The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) covering 10 of the Northeast states cover only the power sector and have an average allowance price of about $18 in 2024.[9] The Californian ETS market cover about 76% of State's emissions (agriculture, mining, transport, building, industry and power sectors) with an average auction price of $35 in 2024.[10] According to the OECD, in 2021, the United States priced about 41% of its carbon emissions from energy use and about 5% were priced at an effective carbon rate above €60 per ton of CO_2.[11]

3. SUPPLY-SIDE SUPPORT TO INDUSTRIES

3.1. Support mechanisms for R&D&I focused on new green technologies

Support to R&D in the USA is provided through direct financing by federal governments but also as incentives to private interests to support R&D, notably through tax credits for investments in research in innovation. Although they are proportionally smaller with respect to mechanisms supporting the deployment of manufacturing capacities, the different bills passed have provided new funds for R&D, targeted on green technologies. In particular, the ARPA-E agency (which was created in 2019) and the office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) have open tenders for specific research topics related to energy and green technologies and benefited from additional open credits in the IRA.
Additionally, the CHIPS and Science Act[12] amends the Department of Energy Research and Innovation Act and authorizes new programs in many different fields: about $3 billion annually between FY23 and FY27 for basic energy sciences programs, it creates a "Carbon Materials Research Initiative" and a "Carbon Sequestration Research and Geological Computational Science Initiative" granted with $50 million for FY23 through FY27, it authorizes funds for research in Biological and Environmental Research (about $1 billion for FY23 through FY27), advanced scientific computing research program (more than $1 billion over the same period), fusion energy research (with $50 million R$D of fusion materials and more than $1 billion for the Fusion Energy Sciences Program and about $400 million for construction of ITER international fusion project). Other programs are also contained in this title (high energy physics program, nuclear physics program etc.).

3.2. Support mechanisms for the development of new green technologies production units

The IRA is the largest investment by the USA towards clean energy. There are multiple estimates of the IRA cost: the CBO estimated it at $370 billion[13] but Goldman Sachs estimated a significantly higher cost of $1.2 trillion.[14] This is because most of the provisions are uncapped tax incentives (approximately three quarters of the total cost in CBO's estimation) while the remaining quarter is divided between subsidy and loan programs.
Support to manufacturing is organized around two key instruments: production tax credits and investment tax credits.
Production tax credits (PTC) are directly related to the production of goods (or energy) and notably related to:

- the production of clean hydrogen (with less than 4 kg of CO_2/kg of H_2) decreasing with CO_2 intensity ($3.00 for carbon neutral H_2);the nuclear power production (credit of 1.5 cents multiplied by kWh of electricity produced with some reduction of the credit rules);the manufacturing of clean energy technology components produced in the US or by US possession;
- from 2025 onward the clean electricity production tax credit, a tech-neutral PTC emissions-based incentive, neutral and flexible between clean electricity technologies: a PTC of 1.5 cents per kWh of electricity produced and sold or stored at facilities with zero or negative GHG emissions

[9] International Carbon Action Partnership: https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/ets/usa-regional-greenhouse-gas-initiative-rggi; US Environmental Protection Agency, (2025), Greenhouse gas reduction (last updated on September 30, 2025)

[10] International Carbon Action Partnership: https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/ets/usa-california-cap-and-trade-program

[11] OECD (2022). *Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Turning Climate Targets into Climate Action*, OECD Series on Carbon Pricing and Energy Taxation, OECD Publishing.

[12] Title I in division B.

[13] Estimated Budget Effects Of The Revenue Provisions Of Title I – Committee On Finance, Of An Amendment In The Nature Of A Substitute To H.R. 5376, "An Act To Provide For Reconciliation Pursuant To Title II Of S. Con. Res. 14," As Passed By The Senate On August 7, 2022, And Scheduled For Consideration By The House Of Representatives On 12 August, 2022.

[14] Goldman Sachs (17 April, 2023): The US is poised for an energy revolution

with a 10% bonus for projects located in energy communities (brownfield sites or fossil fuel communities), 10% bonus for meeting domestic manufacturing requirements for steel, iron, or manufactured components and 10% bonus for projects located in low-income communities or Tribal land;for Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) and Direct Air Capture (DAC) a tax credit is extended and increases the credit amount (from $50 to $85 per ton for CCUS for industrial facilities and power plants for saline geologic formations for example) and decreases minimum plan size eligibility threshold (point-source carbon capture projects on electric generating units are eligible only in the capture equipment is designed to capture at least 75% of unit CO_2 production).

The investment tax credits (ITC) are similar, although they are related to infrastructure investment rather than production. Similar to the clean electricity PTC, there's a tech-neutral clean electricity ITC from 2025 onwards. Taxpayers may choose between a PTC and an ITC. It creates an ITC of 30% of the investment in the year the facility is placed in service (with the same bonus as for the PTC), clean electricity projects smaller than 5 MW can include costs of interconnection. The Advanced Energy Project Credit extends the 30% investment tax credit to clean energy projects to strengthen domestic energy manufacturing and support the production and recycling of clean energy products. It also expands the credit at manufacturing facilities that want to reduce their GHG emissions by at least 20% (this is applicable to low-carbon industrial heat, CCUS, equipment for recycling, waste reduction and energy efficiency).

Financial support is also provided with the DoE Loan Programs Office which has over $43 billion of new available loans including $40 billion in "Title 17" clean energy financing loan, and $3 billion for advanced vehicles technology.

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also contains multiple funds to support demonstration projects of clean industrial processes.[15] It aims to create four regional clean hydrogen hubs, from producers to end-users as well as facilities to transport and store H_2, with an $8 billion budget through project grants. $3.5 billion are allocated through grants and cooperative agreements for regional Direct Air Capture (DAC) projects with the aim to create 4 DAC hubs (with DAC facilities, CO_2 storage and CO_2 users). $500 million are allocated for demonstration of industrial emissions reduction technologies (through cooperative agreements) with an additional $550 million for SMEs (project grants). For the automotive industry, $6 billion support the development of domestic supply chain for batteries with 2 programs: one for demonstration, construction and retooling of battery material processing techniques and facilities, and one targeting battery manufacturing and recycling.

[15] These funding opportunities can combine with additional IRA funding opportunities. See for example this table published by the USA Environmental Protection Agency combining both funding opportunities.

On 20 January, 2025, his first day into office, Trump froze IRA funding, putting many clean energy projects on pause.[16] This decision has been revoked by the decision of a federal judge in April 2025, who ordered the agencies to unfreeze the funds voted by Congress during a previous administration immediately.[17] Debates in Congress are still ongoing about further legislation on the matter, phasing out investment tax credits (ITCs) and production tax credits (PTCs), in order to avoid the construction of new clean energy plants, and to stop supporting the installation of residential solar panels, insulation and heat pumps.

3.3. Support mechanisms for the decarbonization of existing industrial production units

The Advanced Industrial Facilities Deployment Program of the IRA is the main program with $5.8 billion (funding in grants, rebates, direct loan or cooperative agreements) under the Office of Clean Energy Demonstration to invest in projects aimed at reduction emissions (including retrofit facilities) from energy intensive industries (iron, steel, concrete, glass, pulp, paper, ceramics and chemical production).

4. DEMAND-SIDE SUPPORT TO INDUSTRIES

4.1. Support mechanisms incentivizing private demand in green markets

The IRA has extended existing private demand support for clean technologies (notably the clean vehicle tax credit) but introduced new controversial conditions for the purchase of electric vehicles, with local content requirements (see next section). Other incentives might also exist at state level but were not covered in the perimeter of our study.

For residential efficiency, a credit for residential clean energy (solar, wind, geothermal, biomass fuel, and battery storage) is extended through 2034, with 30% credit for projects started before 2032. An energy efficiency home improvement credit is extended through 2032 and increased from 10% to 30% with a $1,200 annual credit limit (increased to $2,000 for heat pumps and biomass stoves). Additionally, it allowed a budget of $4.5 billion through 2031 for grants from DoE to States and Tribes for High-Efficiency Electric Home Rebate Program: it provides up to $14,000 per household (including $8,000 for heat pumps, $1,750 for heat pump water heaters, and $840 for electric stoves) and includes rebates for improvements to electrical panels or wiring and home insulation.

[16] Executive Order 14154, entitled Unleashing American Energy.

[17] https://www.esgdive.com/news/judge-orders-trump-reinstate-inflation-reduction-act-funding/745653/ / https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.59116/gov.uscourts.rid.59116.45.0.pdf

Moreover, a new $27 billion Greenhouse Gas Reduction fund[18] was provided to the EPA for grants to state, local, regional and tribal programs for low and zero carbon technologies and can act as seed capital for green banks. This fund is rather focused on the deployment of clean technologies in low-income and disadvantaged communities.

4.2. Public procurement strategy favoring green products and local content requirements

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law has reinforced the "Buy American Act" by introducing the "Buy America, Build America" (BABA) condition. It requires the use of domestically sourced inputs for federally funded projects or to make the case why that is not possible. Agencies can grant waivers to funding recipients, but this requires the firm to make a concrete case for why making the majority of a product in the USA is not feasible. BIL funded projects must use 100% iron and steel produced in the USA as well as meet BABA provisions for manufactured products and nonferrous construction materials (plastics, polymer, glass etc.). A total of at least 55% of the value of the product (excluding labor) used in a project must be manufactured in the USA.

President Biden also introduced in an Executive Order[19] a 100% zero-emissions light-duty vehicles acquisition goal by 2027 for the federal fleet, as part of the larger "Federal Sustainability Plan".

4.3. Regulation and norms favoring green industries

Certain norms and regulations in the US aim to favour green industries. The Biden administration released in 2023 a first "National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization",[20] which includes action plan for rail energy and emissions innovation,[21] produced by the United States Departments of Energy, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and the Environmental Protection Agency. In April 2024, this was followed by the "National Blueprint for the Buildings Sector"[22] was released to reduce GHG emissions from the building sector by 65% by 2035 and by 90% by 2050. The Blueprint outlines federal actions to speed up building decarbonization, including funding R&D to develop low-cost technologies, providing direct funding and financing, supporting the development of emissions-reducing building codes and appliance standards. The Federal Buildings Performance Standard,[23] published in December 2022, also mentioned how the Federal government would deliver a net-zero emissions building portfolio by 2045, with a 50% GHG emissions reduction by 2032, based on energy efficiency and electrification. This performance standard was based on deep energy retrofits and strategic equipment replacement in existing buildings, campuses and installations.

The IRA maintained a pre-existing clean vehicle tax credit with a $7,500 consumer credit for a purchase of a qualified new clean vehicle (including EVs, plug-in hybrids and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) but has added new conditions. A certain percentage of critical minerals in batteries (from 40% in 2024 to 80% in 2026) should be extracted or processed in the US, of a Free Trade Agreement country, or recycled in North America with a maximum vehicle price ($55,000 and $80,000 for SUVs or vans), credit is reduced or eliminated if the EV is not assembled in North America or the majority of battery components are sourced outside of North America, and an income eligibility ($150,000 for single person). It also eliminates previous manufacturer quotas. For previously owned clean vehicles, the tax credit is equal to $4,000 or 30% of the vehicle cost (with a maximum sale price of $25,000 and the model must be at least 2 years old after the sale) with income eligibility limits. Finally for commercial clean vehicles, the credit is $7,5000 for the purchase of qualified light clean vehicles and $40,000 for heavy vehicles.

The IRA did not have the legislative competence to introduce new regulation other than such tax incentives. Some requirements were introduced for oil and gas lease sales in order to favor the development of offshore wind lease issuance. Similarly, the BIL focuses on deploying new funds dedicated for infrastructure building.

The IRA however provided additional resources to various federal agencies to improve and fasten regulatory processes. For example, $760 million were granted for DoE to provide grants to facilitate and accelerate the siting and permitting of interstate transmission projects, $350 million for the Environmental Review Improvement Fund of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act that seeks to accelerate and streamline the environmental review process. The Environmental Protection Agency received $250 million to support the development of standardized, high-quality, transparent environmental product declaration of GHG emission associated with construction materials.

5. LABOR AND SOCIAL POLICIES FOR A JUST INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION

The IRA also has numerous provisions for agriculture & forestry and more generally for community investment and energy justice. Many instruments have additional "bonus" beyond the base credits for projects that use domestic content or invest in

[18] https://www.epa.gov/greenhouse-gas-reduction-fund/about-greenhouse-gas-reduction-fund

[19] Executive Order 14057 of December 8, 2021, Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and Jobs Through Federal Sustainability.

[20] The US National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization: A joint Strategy to Transform Transportation, January 2023.

[21] https://climateprogramportal.org/resource/the-u-s-national-blueprint-for-transportation-decarbonization-rail-energy-and-emssions-action-plan/

[22] Decarbonizing the US Economy by 2050: A National Blueprint for the Buildings Sector, April 2024, US Government.

[23] Federal Buildings Performance Standard, December 2022.

brown-field retired coal communities or in low-income communities. Every recipient of an IRA competitive grant needs to provide a Community Benefit Plan that explains how the project may affect marginalized communities and how it will address any adverse impacts. CBP are meant to go beyond job creation and look at issues of job quality, access and broader metrics of community well-being. CBPs score at 20% of the technical merit review of proposals and are posted on the DoE's website.

Similarly, in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, most of the financing tools have conditions over the labor and equity standard. In particular, it has extended the reach of the David Bacon Act which establishes minimum wages for workers employed in the construction industry. Most of the grants also require project labor agreements (collective bargaining agreements), community workforce agreements, these are ex ante agreements discussed between workers and project developers establishing the financial and non-financial benefits of workers. They often need to also establish community benefit agreements that go beyond PLAs and define in a broader sense benefits for the local communities.

6. TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL POLICIES

6.1. Policies aiming at improving resilience and de-risk global supply chains

The Biden administration has largely pursued the orientation of the previous Trump administration to decouple from Chinese manufacturing and secure value chains against "foreign countries of concern" coercion (mostly China and Russia). This is the main reason provided to support local content requirements of clean vehicle tax credits and the BABA condition in the BIL. More aggressive provisions were also scheduled in the CHIPS and Science Act: any company receiving grants and benefits directly from federal government grants must limit the expansion of companies' operations in foreign countries of concern (China) for 10 years.

The Biden Administration has also continued the containment policy using trade policy. The review of inbound investments in critical technologies or infrastructure through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (2018) has been expanded to new technologies (AI, microelectronics, advanced clean energy)[24] and used in June 2024 for ordering divestment of a company majority-owned by Chinese shareholders from a real estate located within one mile of Warren Air Force Base. New restrictions also apply to outbound investment in China,[25] and the Biden administration has adopted new tariffs to protect the solar manufacturing[26] and other sectors[27] against Chinese competition and rolling out new export controls on critical technologies, including quantum computing and semiconductor goods.[28]

President Donald Trump has made various announcements concerning increased trade tariffs worldwide since coming into office. However, there seems to be a consensus among experts that US trade tariffs will not produce the desired effect of boosting domestic US industrial investments. On the contrary, the uncertainty around trade tariffs risks driving up supply costs (for EV batteries and solar panels industries, for instance). This, along with the potential repeal of IRA measures and tax credits, creates harmful uncertainty for US businesses.

6.2. Policies supporting internationalization of national industries

The USA are implementing new partnerships with allied countries in order to foster cooperation and "friendshoring". In particular, the Minerals Security Partnership aims to accelerate the development of diverse and sustainable critical energy minerals supply chains through working with host governments and industry to facilitate targeted financial and diplomatic support for strategic projects along the value chain. MSP partners include Australia, Canada, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union (represented by the European Commission).

The Biden administration has also supported the development of large free-trade partnership with the "Partnerships for Economic Prosperity" signed with multiple American countries (Americas Partnership for Economic prosperity) and in the Indo-Pacific region (Indo-Pacific partnership for Economic Prosperity – IPEF).

[24] Executive Order on Ensuring Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (15 September, 2022).

[25] U.S. Department of the Treasury Final Rule to implement President Biden's Executive Order 14105 of 9 August, 2023, "Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern." (28 October, 2024).

[26] FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Takes Action to Strengthen American Solar Manufacturing and Protect Manufacturers and Workers from China's Unfair Trade Practices (16 May, 2024).

[27] FACT SHEET: President Biden Takes Action to Protect American Workers and Businesses from China's Unfair Trade Practices (14 May, 2024).

[28] U.S. Department of Commerce "Commerce Control List Additions and Revisions; Implementation of Controls on Advanced Technologies Consistent With Controls Implemented by International Partners" (6 September, 2024).

Monteiro de Macedo, P., Berghmans, N., Kauffmann, C., Lévy, P. (2025). New industrial policies: lessons for the EU and the Clean Industrial Deal - Case study: New industrial policy in the USA. IDDRI, *Note*.

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CONTACT
nicolas.berghmans@iddri.org
philippine.levy@iddri.org

Institut du développement durable
et des relations internationales
41, rue du Four – 75006 Paris – France

WWW.IDDRI.ORG
IDDRI | BLUESKY
IDDRI | LINKEDIN