Sustainable development: Elements of the international context

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The current system in question

During the decade that followed the implosion of the Soviet system, the prospect of global order based on international rule of law, true cooperation amongst nations, integration of a broad range of stakeholders in international negotiations, and the creation of rules and standards through collaborative procedures, all appeared to lay the outlines for a new international order. Cooperative strategies, ratified and guided in particular by multilateral organisations, seemed to be capable of forming the basis for this process, both participating in and counterbalancing economic and financial globalisation. Environmental issues had been pointing in this direction for a long time and the adoption of the concept of sustainable development (combining economic, social and environmental factors) came across as a universal goal enabling all parties - nations, stakeholders and institutions - to adopt this normative horizon and its constraints both in their own interests and for the common good. The process was undoubtedly unfinished, but the general direction had been laid out, suggesting certain procedures and a cumulative process.

The September 11 2001 attacks deeply changed the perception the United States, with an obvious leadership role in the multilateral process, had of the outside world and of the importance of their national interest, in
particular by putting security at the forefront of collective goods. The second Gulf war and the diplomatic tension that preceded it have shown that American hegemony could, if its government deemed it necessary, fall back on unilateral solutions and the hard power of military force. In addition, for the same doctrinal reasons, it could, in other fields, decide to disengage itself from international agreements, in the name of effectiveness and national interest. A traditional view of foreign policy and international relations would thus triumph over a vision—moreover imperfect and incomplete—of global policy and governance.

This text will acknowledge the above change in stance as its point of departure. For the very reason that the United States is in a hegemonic position this has become an important or even decisive element in international relations and in the definition of a working framework for cooperative strategies on a global scale.

The American change of posture is not the only factor opposing the progressive multilateral development of an optimum global collective. Developing countries have, for various reasons, been very critical when seeking to have their interests and limitations recognised within the global regulatory system. The latter deals with their expectations only very partially, and developing countries consider it unfair with respect to stated priorities, agendas, and procedures for their establishment.

On the other hand, questions of collective interest, and the need for cooperative strategies have not simply disappeared: negotiating platforms remain necessary for articulating choices and collective preferences. The new framework will therefore undoubtedly submit the question of collective action to a much more strict discussion concerning substantive objectives (in particular concerning sustainable development). At the same time, it will require additional efforts to achieve consensus on priorities, diagnoses, legitimacy and effectiveness of measures alike. The divergent opinions that can be heard demand renewed reflection based on existing practices and dynamics in order to create frameworks for action able to overcome current standoffs.

More numerous and more urgent collective issues

Globalisation signifies that events, decisions, and actions that take place in one region of the world affect the events, decisions and actions in other regions (Held & McGrew, 2001). Economic and financial integration is undoubtedly not a new phenomenon, but globalisation today takes specific shapes and operates in new areas (Gemdev, 1999; Boyer, 2002). Integration of financial markets, trade in goods and services trade development, movement of persons, internationalisation of production and development of communication technologies have all contributed to produce interdependencies that reach beyond the borders and the expertise of individual nations.

These interdependencies can be beneficial—the production and diffusion of knowledge is the best example—, but they can also be detrimental. This is the case when failures in global markets are not corrected by public action or when
problems go beyond the management capacity of states; classic examples of detrimental interdependencies are the transmission of financial market instability or ubiquitous damage to the environment.

In most cases, the consequences of globalisation are ambivalent. For instance, trade of goods and services has also sharply increased, under the influence in particular of GATT and later of WTO multilateral trade negotiations. This increase has been accompanied by a notable change in production methods, in consumption and in trade and has been beneficial for growth, albeit sometimes highly unequal, including in many developing countries. However, the increased density of trade fluctuations has also resulted in externalities associated with market failures or with public actions, in particular overuse of natural resources and the development of illegal trade flows. In the same way, the increasing ease with which people travel is an incentive for sharing knowledge and values but it also increases the speed of pandemic spread.

Finally, collective risks are growing: cross border nuclear risks, transport of toxic substances or hazardous waste, the risks associated with deterioration of public goods –ocean, air– the increase of environmental refugees... All of these risks, which are difficult to control, are often difficult to manage successfully, in particular for the weakest stakeholders. In a certain number of cases, the reconfiguration of nations –which are in transition or under adjustment– doesn’t enable the maintenance of effective control and security systems.

A change in perception

Whatever the point of view adopted, awareness of the existence of collective problems is apparent. The list of these global issues is long, and it continues to grow as those formerly dealt with within national borders extend beyond the traditional geography of power: threats to the global environment, nuclear security, natural resource degradation, world population growth, massive trafficking, risk of sanitary contamination, instability of financial markets... The important point is that these stakes do not lie within the scope of traditional management of bilateral or regional interdependencies, but rather repeatedly present collective action problems. This is particularly obvious in the cases of protection of global environmental quality, preservation of natural resources or pandemic prevention, which moreover all provide classic examples for the theory of externalities (Cornes & Sandler, 1996).

The growing awareness of these new forms of interdependence, underscored by official initiatives, citizen movements, and even by the actions of certain firms, has been a very far-reaching change for global governance. Moreover, modern theories of security have been adapted in consequence, adopting the notion of security at large, and some governments have already created global issue departments.

Above and beyond government responsibilities, the identification and acceptance on the negotiating and international collective action agenda of a growing number of issues are linked to the emergence of new stakeholders
who contribute to the construction of collective preferences. The stakeholders involved in international coordination debates have diversified. In addition to scientists, non-governmental organisations, local governments, legislative bodies, professional and union networks, and often the private sector have become involved in issues and in the construction of solutions.

International networks of scientists and experts have been formed to investigate various subjects, in particular risks and damage. The most pertinent examples are the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and WHO studies on contagious illnesses and major pandemics. The notion of epistemic community takes into account this role of expertise in the identification of a problem at the global level (Haas, 1992). These issue-oriented communities establish the scope and urgency of the problem, validate research results and enable a degree of convergence amongst both governments and public opinion when evaluating uncertainty. The recognition of valid expertise by governments and major international stakeholders is a key factor for negotiation success. Thanks to IPCC research, the global warming phenomenon has been evaluated, consequences for our environment have been identified and the necessary emission reduction has been quantified. IPCC findings have formed the basis for negotiation of the Kyoto protocol. Their importance has been verified a contrario by the new American administration, which sought to contest their validity, only to find itself contradicted by its own scientific community.

NGOs are often responsible for the identification of problems caused by new economic procedures, which the most powerful stakeholders or nations ignore. For example, NGOs have concentrated their criticisms on trade liberalisation by showing that it eclipses problems of social and economic inequality and negative effects on the environment. NGO networks that formed during the Uruguay Round and the activists opposed to a new Round of negotiations in Seattle have raised a major point that negotiators had not anticipated: liberalisation agreements affect areas of collective choices situated well beyond simple questions of custom tariffs or competition rules.

Firms have also become global actors that participate in the implementation of international standards that represent the collective interest, thus moving beyond their traditional role in defining commercial standards. Their visibility as well as their sensitivity to reputation variations and to citizen action or NGO campaigns, encourage global companies to apply internationally the social or environmental standards that are required of them in developed countries. For this reason, they have become creators of standards to verify sustainable management, for example in the case of fishery or forestry, often through contractual agreements with non-governmental organisations or with certain governments.

Levels of governance and representation, above and below national governments themselves, have also become active players in these international discussions. This is true of urban councils –some larger cities have more economic power than certain nations–, of regional governments or of any other form of territorial organisation. This is also true of national legislative bodies (parliamentary assemblies, Congressional committees, etc.), which coordinate their actions and analyses and can also influence discussions.
in this regard the example of the European Parliament is particularly relevant.

Finally, public opinion has become aware of the links between globalisation and risk, thanks to the general media and in particular the specialized media. This has contributed to broadening the range of global issues requiring attention from the international community. For example public health, food security and financial stability have emerged as issues linked (positively or negatively) to globalisation.

The cost of inaction

The growth in awareness of the existence of problems requiring resolution on a global scale stems from increased consciousness of the economic, social and environmental costs they engender.

Evaluation of problems is nonetheless insufficient to instigate collective action. This is difficult to achieve, as cooperation amongst nations for the creation of a common good requires all countries to participate in the action and to pay for part of the cost. Depending on the problem to be dealt with, action must either be undertaken by everyone or can rely on the efforts of a small few. The initiation of collective actions is obviously linked to the perception of costs associated with inaction, insufficient action, and the behaviour of "free riders", i.e. countries or stakeholders deciding to bypass collective rules.

The cost of inaction, or of insufficient or uncoordinated action, is difficult to evaluate. In fact, several factors are involved: the opportunity costs of certain prevention schemes in comparison with others, for example in the area of health care, environment, the existence value of environmental goods that are difficult to quantify, or the uncertainty concerning the recovery of costs over the long term, such as in the case of global warming.

Economic costs of poor global governance are not always apparent in the short-term. The collective goods in question are rarely produced spontaneously by the market, which does not incorporate social costs unless public authorities intervene. Finally, cost distribution can differ significantly from benefit distribution, and this doesn't necessarily promote solidarity.

In the case of public health, the costs of pandemics can be extremely high for the economies that have to deal with them. They have direct costs for the countries they devastate, long-term costs in terms of human capital and therefore development, and represent a potential economic and health risk for countries untouched by the pandemic itself.

The difficulties in measuring the cost of poor environmental governance represent a major problem for collective action. The benefits that are to be expected are mostly long term benefits. The costs of replacing natural resources are hard to measure, yet the losses attributable to renouncing their use are immediately noticeable. Moreover, the losses are borne by identifiable economic actors while the benefits are collective in nature and their distribution remains particularly uncertain since they are long term benefits. As pressure on the environment inevitably grows due to
demographic pressures and economic growth until it represent a major risk, difficulties in achieving convergence in the expectation of costs and benefits is the principal reason for environmental inaction.

The costs of inaction concerning global problems are unequally distributed. They obviously weigh most heavily on the weakest economies, which cannot easily substitute among different resources and whose capacities for adaptation are limited. This is currently an important point in the discussion on global warming, and the evaluation of the costs of global warming has triggered numerous debates. The IPCC currently estimates that if the level of carbon dioxide concentration doubles relative to the level of the pre-industrial era, GDP costs could reach 1 to 1.5 percent per year for developed countries but 2 to 9 percent for developing countries.

Environmental deterioration is also a poverty factor. Forest exploitation provides a pertinent example. A World Bank estimate considers that deforestation costs 1.8 percent of GDP per year in Southern Asian countries and 1.1 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa countries (World Bank, 2001). For every 100 hectares of tropical forest that disappears, 50 hectares become eroded land.

Analysis and assessment undertaken by international society on the shortcomings of the governance system are highly uneven according to the various issues. The amount of attention bestowed on financial instability has led to a development of the theories of liberalization of financial markets and has resulted in the emergence of approaches to institutional solutions even as collective action is initiated. (Coeuré, Pisany-Ferry, 2001). A consensus on the costs of protectionism has played a central role in trade policy to achieve a consensus on the construction of the WTO, which represents a major institutional development.

**The emergence of a new international solidarity**

The emergence of de facto global solidarity, which became apparent in particular with the growth of the notion of global public goods and economic social, and cultural rights.

Two elements combine to ensure that these two notions are inscribed on the governance agenda. On the one hand, official development assistance has stagnated despite the persistence of poverty and the number of the excluded. On the other hand, a justice objective at the global level is increasingly included in the formation of sustainable development objectives.

In the distant past, the questions of human rights and public goods were considered almost exclusively in a national context. Although they were recognised as "universal" rights by various constitutions, their effective application depended mainly on domestic political regimes and economies, national sovereignty preventing these rights from being entrenched elsewhere than on national soil and within the jurisdictions produced by each of the systems. The existence of an international, even universal, reference was nonetheless influential for the adoption of international regulations concerning these rights (the abolition of slavery and the Geneva Convention
on armed conflicts in particular), or for internal struggles dealing with civil rights (women's rights, freedom of the press, of associations, or of religion).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 marked a turning point in that it states the principle, as a foundation of the United Nations charter, of a sort of world citizenship for all—albeit a citizenship without a corresponding nation and without an international jurisdiction for asserting these rights. For nearly three decades, the question of economic, social and cultural rights, validated in principle by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted in 1966, remained largely rhetorical for nearly three decades. It has nonetheless become more substantial with series of international gatherings dealing with the right to food, health, housing, water, etc.

Today, two major divergent conceptions oppose those who feel that "powerful universalism" of these rights is necessary and that the question of their achievement is an international responsibility, and those who feel that these rights remain the responsibility of national systems. In the first case, the supply of public goods corresponding to these rights (health care, safe and sufficient food, water, housing, education, etc.) is considered an international issue, a global social contract, entailing public development aid renewal. In the second case, it is deemed to be a national social contract. Only extreme crisis situations (famine, civil war) may require recourse to international intervention.

Given the hypothesis of universally recognised rights, the supply of goods could thus become a conditionality for international public aid, in support of intergenerational equity—one of the principles of sustainable development. Beyond guaranteeing fundamental and civic rights, access to these basic public goods would ensure the worldwide completion of a notion of democracy with an economic and social dimension. The current world view, divided by opposition between those who "benefit" and those who are "excluded" from the overall economic process, could thus converge.

Difficult negotiations, nascent solutions

In 1992, the Rio Earth Summit defined new objectives for international cooperation based on the notion of sustainable development. After thirty years of debate on the "economic progress" of developing countries and the burying of discussions on the new international economic order, it provided the groundwork for a new international compromise by attempting to reconcile the preferences of developed and developing countries. It was a real aggiornamento for the international community, which defined shared responsibilities, and tried to differentiate among them depending on the country and its level of development.

The search for coordinated action first resulted in the elaboration of standards and produced a proliferation of international agreements. The question of agreement effectiveness was quickly raised: what means could be used to ensure that negotiated standards were applied? How could "free
rider" behaviour be avoided and systems installed that were sufficiently solid to sustainably modify behaviour?

The institutional follow up to the Rio Summit did not meet initial expectations, but a new field of dialogue and negotiation was opened, especially concerning the environment. Although the result and the effectiveness of these negotiations has been questioned and reasonably so, the Earth Summit will nonetheless certainly remain an important step in the learning process for all of the stakeholders concerned, and in the evolution of discussion methods and procedures.

What is undoubtedly more worrying, after this phase of parallel negotiations, is the limited impact on governments during the past three important meetings intended to provide direction and ambition to global governance: the Millennium Summit (2000), the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development (2002) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002).

Institutions under fire

These international gatherings confirmed the idea that commitments to collectively resolve global problems were not priorities for the international community. Criticisms, sometimes originating from politically opposed origins, gradually fused together to oppose the current negotiating system.

The question of legitimacy is central to these critiques. A fundamental aspect of global governance, international institutions are considered illegitimate to the extent that they go beyond their mandate. They are also denounced insofar as they are not under the control of democratic governments, and are not adequately accountable for their actions. They are also accused of imposing overly strict conditionalities and a standardised model of economic and social development that does not take into account the preferences of citizens or the circumstances of specific situations. These institutions have mandates, intervention tools and procedures that outline the direction, the shape and the modalities of their action. They can therefore only prove their legitimacy through efficiency, and through the equity shown in the representation of member states during debates and procedures.

The use of citizens of member states, organised in associations or NGOs, to scrutinise the link between legal mandate and action, is an attempt to surmount these objections. Such "democratic surveillance" requires greater transparency from these institutions and a clear redefinition of their mandate. By progressively encroaching onto the fields of competence of United Nations organs (education, environment, health care...), the Bretton Woods institutions created confusion, wariness and criticism in civil society and contributed to the weakening of UN organisations, already undermined by political blockages. The progressive mismatch between the legal mandate and the effective mandate of these institutions has become a subject of public debate.

Another criticism aimed at international institutions concerns their inefficiency. They are accused of not having addressed the issues for which
they were created, and of not being able to incorporate new questions. The Bretton Woods institutions, for example, have been criticised for their incapacity to control financial crises (IMF), to create real development process or to fight poverty (World Bank). In the end, the only economic development model proposed to various countries was abruptly denounced from within and from without.

The effectiveness of multilateral agreements is also criticised because a number of standards and rules are not observed or barely so, and because the necessary means are lacking without a global executive power to ensure their application.

The international architecture is in fact incomplete and unbalanced. The system’s effectiveness cannot be reduced to the efficiency of each institution. Through the imbalance among institutions, (of means, of capacity to act and to enforce), a de facto hierarchy of objectives for multilateral action is constructed. The international community does not invest in social rights, the fight against tax havens or environmental protection as much as it generates, for example, resources for trade liberalisation.

Finally, the issue of equity remains unresolved in the multilateral system. This system is considered inequitable when the goals that are articulated reflect the interests or the preferences of the most powerful groups or countries. It is also inequitable in its proceedings when decision-making is restricted to a club of countries that then impose their standards on others (Keohane & Nye, 2000; Jacquet, Pisani-Ferry, Tubiana, 2002).

Opposition is not the sole property of traditional denigrators (radical critics or anti-globalisation movements), but is also heard from governments that play an important part in financing these institutions, or from insiders, who no longer feel satisfied with available institutional options.

This complex of criticisms demonstrates that current organisation and negotiation modalities do not allow the operational identification of shared, hierarchically ordered objectives. The blockage is serious, since it is based on two cleavages: on the one hand the perception of global order; and on the other hand differing national and regional situations, preferences and interests. The debate is simplified to the point of caricature, when it is thought possible to project onto global governance issues the schematic opposition developed by Robert Kagan (2003) concerning security. This author opposes an American "Hobbesian" view of an anarchical, violent world requiring the use of will by a powerful but benevolent power, to a European "Kantian" view, in which proponents are persuaded that more law and self-limitation in our behaviours on the basis of negotiated, consensual rules could lead to "perpetual peace". (Kagan, 2003. See also P. Hassner & J. Vaïsse, 2003 on the various American strategic positions).

**Opposing conceptions**

Even if geopolitical issues tend to oversimplify the debate –positions are generally more nuanced and subtle when other forms of coordination are discussed– it still remains true that there are varying conceptions
concerning objectives and operational methods for international order. In this respect, the political differences that emerged in the Atlantic alliance concerning the attitude to be adopted over Iraq brought to the forefront of the public intellectual debate conceptual, methodological, and strategic divergences that appeared to confirm different, perhaps incompatible, views of international relations, and for which possible convergences are far from apparent.

For purposes of analysis it is useful to distinguish three principal currents among the many models of international relations: the realist conception, the neo-liberal conception, and the network governance conception.

The realist view of international relations is not entirely congruent with diplomatic theories with respect to economic governance (Kissinger, 2003). It is based on the principle that the international system is anarchical and no supreme authority exists. The state is the principal actor in international relations (Gilpin, 2002). States may cooperate and create institutions for managing cooperation, but only so long as their interests coincide. Numerous variants exist in this theoretical current, depending on the weight of ideas and ideals, on coordination objectives, and on the varying degree of deference to corporatist economic interests.

Realists believe that the borders of the Nation State are not becoming blurred, contrary to the current of the numerous interpretations of the revolution in information technologies and communication and more generally of globalisation. The constraints imposed by trans-national economic forces, such as trans-national actor networks, do not undermine the supremacy of this type of organisation. If the actors are important, international institutions evolve within a framework defined by nation states, which use their power to influence decisions and practices. When all is said and done, power relationships and their variations must be the main concern of states and are vital tools for preserving their independence.

The institutionalist neo-liberal view is also based on the model of a cooperative of states. It does not question the role of states in the management of the global system, but assigns a central part to institutions (organisations, international regimes) to ensure its coordination. These institutions induce states to cooperate and to avoid "free rider" behaviour, on the basis of their shared interests. This view is based on a theory of rational choice in international relations. Multilateralism allows states to share resources, to reduce transaction costs and to assemble the expertise needed to deal with the complex new fields of international interdependencies. If the collective preferences of the various countries diverge, the reinforcement of institutions and the development of new frameworks for coordination are available to resolve these differences. The delegation of power to independent authorities or to multilateral institutions generates collective benefits. Agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or institutions such as the WTO are able to correct market failures, reduce information asymmetry and guarantee the production of public goods (Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1983).
A third current postulates that governance is a social function that, especially at the international level, must be conceptualized independently of governments. Governance, i.e. the regulation of global affairs, can be carried out by networks of private or public actors associated with international, national or regional institutions. This view conceptualizes the international networks that emerged to find political solutions to concrete problems by creating partnerships between actors of very different kinds, united around shared objectives. A network combines the voluntary commitment of non-governmental organisations with the financial resources of firms, by associating institutional and state capabilities to produce rules and to have them respected (Reinicke & Deng, 2000). They are diversified, flexible, open and fast. They seek efficiency and emerge on an ad hoc basis in situations of political blockage. They can facilitate the implementation of collective decisions at various levels and operate on the basis of their reputation. The network postulates that shared values can emerge despite historical and cultural differences. Some propose forms of institutionalisation for these networks by providing them with a structure and incentives to ensure that the standards produced will be respected by their members (Rischard, 2003), witness the partnerships between firms and NGOs in a certain number of fields: sustainable forest management, production method certification, etc. or between firms and United Nations organisations working in the fields of public health and energy.

**Divergent interests**

Government positions are obviously more heterogeneous in practice than the above archetypes. Surpassing political conjecture, the American administration position is above all the structural result of system asymmetry. Whether conception of the US role is linked to the Wilsonian ideal or to realism, American leadership has been the starting point for the administration’s perception of the system of global order. The United States has never considered itself to be a nation like other nations (Hassner, 2003). After the fall of the Berlin wall, the geopolitical debate never ceased in political and intellectual circles. The Bush administration has clearly chosen a realist hegemonic view, tinged with messianism and unilateralism, in the name of efficiency and vital US interests. With regards to global issues, the US position involves rearranging their hierarchy –AIDS, the fight against terrorism, and drug trafficking, rather than global warming—and sometimes favours contradictory ad hoc solutions. The Bush administration has resumed bilateral and regional trade negotiations and has not hesitated to take protectionist measures for the steel industry. It has also decided to withdraw from a large number of international initiatives and agreements.

Madeleine Albright’s phrase "multilateral when we can, unilateral when we must" has been more or less reversed by the Bush administration. The State Department has developed the idea of ‘à la carte’ multilateralism, without a general commitment, but rather a case-by-case assessment (Richard Haass, 2001) and of a 'coalition of the willing' assembled for specific objectives. The justification of this type of coordination in the name
of effectiveness –always assuming that this effectiveness can be assessed—obviously fails to address the questions of legitimacy and equity.

The European Union claims a position based on two historical factors. On the one hand, its constitution as a group "after the Nation-State", according to the title of Jürgen Habermas' publication (2000), stemmed from the violence of two world conflicts –nationalistic conflicts opposing peoples against each other and leading to massive destruction. On the other hand, the European entity was constructed within the context of the Cold War, under the American geostrategic ‘umbrella’. However critical of the European positions, Robert Kagan points out, "Europe is truly a wonderful miracle that we should celebrate on both sides of the Atlantic." He adds "for European it is the realisation of a long but unlikely dream: a continent freed from nationalistic struggles and bloody confrontations from military rivalry and arms races." (Kagan, 2003)

This is an ambitious political and economic construct. Europe dared, for example, to renounce one of the state’s most symbolic regal prerogatives, currency. During successive enlargements, it also undertook policies of solidarity among member states, transforming this process into the most powerful leveling and economic integration tool that the contemporary world has seen. If it is not a faultless 'white knight', it can nonetheless regard its own reconstruction and adaptation experience as a successful example of a procedural and cooperative system between nation states. Yet this process implies the abandonment of certain national interests for the collective good. It also relies on complex and as yet incomplete negotiations concerning collective choices and preferences.

In this context, it is logical that Europe, also economically powerful, advocates multilateral processes and international negotiation leading to the largest possible consensus. Critics are nonetheless numerous, within the Commission itself, the European Parliament or national governments, or in public opinion. It indicates that this approach can also lead to decisional bureaucracy, to inefficient mechanisms, to loss of substantive focus.

Due to its past, to what it considers its historical responsibilities or its geopolitical alliances, the European Union, almost always unanimously opts for global governance procedures.

Over the past decade, the positions of other countries in international negotiations have become more complex for several reasons.

China's growing importance in the global economy and in international relations, and the projections that have China becoming the world's leading power, have shifted the weight that Japan had until recently in Asia. The idea of a northern hemisphere power triad (United States - European Union - Japan) may still appear useful, yet the Asian pole has become more complex. It must be viewed today as a group of nation states with differing trajectories, but nonetheless increasingly conscious of their shared problems and interdependencies. This pole consists of Japan, which remains the world's third economic power despite its stagnation, and of the old 'dragons' –Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore– to which can be added certain countries of the Indian sub-continent and Vietnam. These
countries have experienced rapid economic growth and their economic interdependency is growing. The centre of gravity of the Pacific pole is thus shifting from Japan, which is solidly attached to American protection, towards China, renascent power not linked to the United States through historical alliance (Vandermeersch, 2003).

The attachment of Japan to the "construction of a multilateral framework for cooperation" is very widely shared by the other governments in the region. Asia's position in global negotiations will therefore remain linked not only to political relations with the United States on strategic issues, but also to the growing perception of shared problems and of regional solutions elaborated to deal with them, in particular within the framework of the ASEAN.

Finally, divergences are appearing within the group of countries that once referred to itself as the 'third world', a unit that is no longer more than a façade. A certain number of larger countries that contributed to the formation of the movement of non-aligned countries in Bandung in 1955 are currently trying to define a new view of international relations founded not only on criticism of an unbalanced and unfair world –this is true of India in particular, but also of Indonesia. The post-colonial page has been turned, but the elaboration of a new paradigm for international cooperation is undoubtedly incomplete. In particular international situations, certain countries may adopt original positions according to their specific situation, yet they are not pro-active when confronted with agendas, procedures and solutions elaborated by the major powers on the international scene.

The larger developing countries are in transition. Some are critical of system's operation as a club and are hesitant to take on international responsibilities, as demonstrated by their positions within the Security Council. Defenders of multilateral solutions –rules protect the weak– they are also inclined to a realist view in the defence of their national interests.

New perspectives on the horizon

The difficulties encountered in multilateral forums when attempts are made to better identify global issues and define means of action have resulted in the creation of other forums for discussion and experimentation. Depending on the problem at hand, these new forms of governance are quite different in nature; they vary from intergovernmental initiatives to strictly private initiatives, with all possible actor combinations in

Network States

In the public sphere, the types of agreements formed between states have multiplied. According to the analysis of Manuel Castells (2003), this is a response by states to a society of networks. Two types of groupings have a more pronounced dynamic: ad hoc regional and international initiatives, and coalitions of the willing, which bring together a limited number of governments.
Fewer global mechanisms are put into place because conceptions of the state diverge and because overall coordination appears unlikely. Regional dynamics provide one possible version of partial coordination. As global economic integration shifts and weakens the role of numerous nation states, the latter have greater difficulty when trying to ensure respect of internal social contracts, defence of national collective preferences and supply of essential public goods. The renewal of regional dynamics provides a way of managing the new aspects of this integration, of trying to recover room for manoeuvre. The impossibility of aggregating collective preferences at the global level is bypassed through their elaboration within regional groups. The zone of possible consensus for a given issue among more than one hundred countries, with heterogeneous representations and knowledge is limited. The formation of clubs can allow the construction of preferences for a series of goods or the elaboration of strategic hypotheses for the supply of regional public goods.

Several examples demonstrate regional coordination of sustainable development. Regional agreements for the management of natural resources exist in the case of the Mediterranean Basin (Haas, 1993), the Baltic Sea (Haas, 1993; UNEP, 1997) and the Great Lakes. Forestry issues have also resulted in regional initiatives in the Amazon and in the Congo Basin. An agreement on trans-border pollution in the ASEAN was signed in June 2002, following forest fires in Indonesia, to limit the amount of burn-over (Koh & Robinson, 2002). Within the NAFTA, regional coordination has underlined environmental preoccupations, but has not yet resolved them. This agreement has in fact served as a test and sometimes as a counter example to understand the effects of trade liberalisation on the environment. As such, it provided a useful learning experience for international agreements. Finally, the Nepad is a new form of political and economic initiative that seeks to independently define public policy norms in an autonomous manner that would empower Africa during international negotiations and help it identify problems and potential solutions.

Drawing on experiments and the assessment of results and problems encountered, these groupings can provide a learning experience or demonstrative effect that can in turn result in global coordination. The legitimacy of governance based on regional groupings is linked to the representation capacity of the member nation states. It also depends on how they exercise their sovereignty, and whether or not they guarantee citizens fundamental rights and access to essential public goods. Associating stakeholders to the formulation of objectives from the outset is essential.

Although the effectiveness of this type of coordination has been shown, in particular in the case of the European Union, the question of equity is very unevenly settled by regional clubs. However, the integration process may render legitimate, as it did in the case of the Union, redistributive transfers as well as facilitate the formation of multilateral solidarities.

How can a global process be reorganised starting with parallel and fragmented regimes? This is undoubtedly the question that will have to be raised continually, not only in the field of trade, where much work has been undertaken, but also in the other fields of sustainable development.
“Coalitions of the willing” have multiplied. A pertinent example is the initiative of diamond-producing countries, the Kimberley Process, in South Africa, formed to develop mechanisms to fight against the illegal diamond trade used to finance armed conflicts. Other initiatives followed, resulting in the signature of the Interlaken Declaration in November 2002, which launched a certification scheme for the identification of diamonds of legal origin.

**Public and private networks and initiatives**

Networks grouping public and private actors around a common objective are the most common modality. Certain networks gather actors of extremely heterogeneous nature and size: international or social NGOs, governments, firms, international financial institutions, local authorities. These networks developed in particular with the goal of producing norms through consensus, and to advance blocked debates. They also provided a learning mechanism for institutions and took on a role in implementation.

The Global Commission on Dams, established in 1998, is a good example of these institutional innovations: its objective was to bypass the doctrinal disputes and conflicts of interest centered on large dams, and it included in the debate the entire range of local, national and global stakeholders. Even the Commission’s financing mechanisms were innovative: they involve funds emanating from firms, NGOs and governments. The Global Compact Initiative, implemented upon United Nations initiative, seeks to promote a certain number of social and environmental principles in firms. In the field of health care, the most commonly cited example is that of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, which groups together international organisations –World Bank, UNICEF, WHO–, foundations –the Gates Foundation programme for the vaccination of children, the Rockefeller Foundation– developing country agencies, bilateral cooperation agencies and a few large firms. Its main objective is to gather the funding necessary to vaccinate children in developing countries against the six most common infectious diseases.

Finally, purely private initiatives, implemented on a completely voluntary basis, are based on the development of the institution of markets. An old example, and the most developed, is that of the International Association of Chambers of Commerce, created in 1919. It generates voluntary rules and has an organ to promote their respect: the International Court of Arbitration.

Other processes for the development of private market rules have developed on the fringe of public action in association with, or to the contrary because of, political blockages. In the case of control of the illegal trade of diamonds, the intergovernmental process was unable to impose controls on the entire product chain. Firms committed themselves to fulfilling the requirements of a mechanism that is more rigorous and undoubtedly more effective if applied with precision. The World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International Association of Diamond Producers created a voluntary self-regulation system for the industry in
order to support the Kimberley Process and to make it effective. Adopted in London in October 2002, this voluntary commitment includes a system for guaranteeing the origin of diamonds, and a code of conduct covering conditions of marketing, procedures for transparency and on help for governments in implementing the Kimberly Process. The objective is to ensure the traceability of marketed diamonds. This system therefore goes further than the Kimberley Process, since it involves the entire product chain (including polished diamonds and jewellery) rather than simply rough diamonds, as was previously the case.

**Private initiatives on the margin of the state**

Confronted with the American administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, certain American companies and urban areas pledged to reduce their emissions by 4 per cent in the coming four years, compared with the average over the years 1998-2001. This commitment was implemented in connection with the creation of the Chicago Climate Exchange, a trading market for greenhouse gas emissions. Firms exceeding their commitments will be able to sell their credits to those failing to achieve them.

The voluntary certification of forest management is an example of private initiative associating the non-governmental sector and firms. The objective of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), created in 1993 at the initiative of the WWF, is to set performance standards for the sustainable management of forests. The FSC Board of Directors is comprised of actors from the field of forestry, from diverse countries and backgrounds: conservation groups, forestry companies, indigenous peoples' organisations, etc. Forests are not directly controlled by the FSC. Rather, its role is to evaluate and control the activity of independent forest product certification organizations.

The success of these partnerships obviously depends on a base of confidence between members and on the means of managing network power asymmetries (Reinicke & Deng, 2000). One of the problems raised by these partnerships is that the actors do not all have the same type of responsibility and that they are not always accountable to the same stakeholders. The lack of democratic legitimacy in these networks raises the question of control and oversight mechanisms. The latter could be based on reputation, accounting and financial standards and peer evaluation. In the same way, the question of access and the open nature of these networks is crucial in order to avoid the creation of clubs that exclude representation of certain interests. Such clubs could in effect serve to justify certain interests and practices, thus blocking collective progress and the realisation of shared objectives. Finally, network efficiency is essential, since it represents the main justification of their existence: do networks achieve concrete results superior to those that could be expected from spontaneous practice?
Conclusion

The Millennium objectives can legitimately be considered as a charter outlining action of the international community for sustainable development. Consensus on these objectives is already a point of entry even if the means to achieve them are apparently far from being identified. After ten years of international negotiations to construct a system of governance aimed at an international rule of law, the intergovernmental process is blocked. In order for the system to be effective, further loss of sovereignty must be accepted, to enable this international rule of law to draw on a system of constraint. Governments today, however, are reluctant to give up sovereignty, and all the more so since they do not share a long-term view of international order. The recurring dichotomy between a global order based on force and the use of power and a view advocating international order built on collectively negotiated rules has redoubled in force. Without a minimum degree of agreement as to the direction to follow, it has become very difficult to continue to involve all of the international community's nations in a process of complete and far-reaching rule production. In this respect, the doctrinal position of the world's leading power is obviously a key element to success. Larger developing countries are divided as to the type of system that would guarantee defence of their legitimate interests. Finally, Europe, which remains the defender of the idea of global governance, is not currently in a position to show real leadership or to play an effective role as mediator.

Notwithstanding, the issues that the Millennium objectives address remain just as pressing and underscore major economic, social and environmental risks, at a planetary level. It's time to get out of the rut. Moral or doctrinal positions will undoubtedly be of little help. The issue of global governance will make headway through practice and use of existing or potential processes. Prioritising shared objectives, while remaining flexible concerning their arrangements, forms of cooperation or types of partnerships, may be one way out. The many networks that are organised around issues must be thoroughly analysed, and their procedures studied. The extent of fragmentation created by the multiplication of partial international regimes, which may comprise a structural facet of the system, must also be assessed.

These reflections raise further questions. How might these fragmented regimes co-exist? What potential conflicts (economic, commercial, political) and what competition might this heterogeneity beget? Will these clubs, networks and coalitions, which have the undeniable merit of enlarging the circle of involved actors, be the basis of legitimate, effective and fair global governance, and if so under what conditions?


