What rationales for international development aid? Main donors’ objectives and implications for France

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CHALLENGING THE ROLE OF ODA ON THE 2030 AGENDA
The changeover from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), universal and indivisible, raises the question of what role official development assistance (ODA) plays in the new 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. The needs for sustainable investment are far in excess of ODA flows, and the political objectives of “containment” that prevailed when development assistance first emerged are unquestionably obsolete. The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the rationales, motivations and objectives of ODA they appear in the official documents and websites of the United Kingdom, Germany, France and China, and to draw some specific implications for French ODA.

PROFOUND DIFFERENCES IN HOW DONORS JUSTIFY THEIR ODA
“Indispensable” ODA focuses on stabilising fragile or failing States and on extreme poverty (United Kingdom, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation), “remedial” ODA is a means of building global policies able to “manage” or “repair” globalisation to the benefit of countries in the Global South (France, Germany). “Emancipatory” assistance offers recipient countries both an alternative to the conditional aid granted by the former colonial powers, and the prospects of self-development supported by shared commercial interests (China).

AID NARRATIVES HARBOUR BLIND SPOTS
The expected role of external financing in achieving the objectives of stability and poverty alleviation for fragile and failing States (indispensable assistance), the sustainability of funding through loans and the reality of their leverage effect (remedial assistance), and the environmental sustainability of emerging development models (emancipatory assistance).

FRENCH ODA: DOVETAILING DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE
France, in its choice of bilateral allocation of ODA, only honours imperfectly its discourse. The ambition to offset the effects of globalization is reflected in the allocation for global public goods and climate, which has been growing strongly in recent years. On the other hand, the economic development of middle-income countries remains an objective privileged by France, which deserves to be clarified in the discourse. Spending on stability and social justice is lagging behind other issues.
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Objective, Method and Main Results

In pursuit of widely diverse goals such as containing Communist expansion, eradicating absolute poverty and decarbonizing electricity production, official development assistance (ODA) has now been available for more than half a century, targeting results that in terms of number and variety continue to raise the question of how useful it really is. What is the point of development aid in the world of Daesh, of the Panama Papers and of the 17 sustainable development objectives (SDGs)?

The aim of this paper is to supply answers to this question, from the perspective of ODA contributors, who ask themselves a similar question in order to justify such aid. We do not adopt the beneficiaries’ viewpoint due to the lack of available survey data on the (perceived) effects of aid among the populations in recipient countries.1 We focus therefore on the official texts of the main European donors—the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany, as well as communications from China and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), whose grants have been recognized by the OECD’s Development Aid Committee since 2011.

When reading these texts, we set about listing and categorising the rationales underlying ODA (Box 1 specifies what the term “aid” encompasses in this paper). We thereby managed to identify five main narratives. A second part of our work, we matched discourse and facts for the case of French ODA. For this, we compared the hypothetical allocation of French aid as can be surmised from the discourses justifying it with its actual allocation. To conclude, we attempted to identify the weaknesses and conditions for the success of ODA on the 2030 timeline.

The following key points were identified by our research.

1. Our reading of the national narratives shows that the Addis Ababa Agreement on development financing arrangements and the consensus around the goals expressed by the SDGs (Box 2) mask profound differences between the donors when it comes to the justification and the hallmarks of their ODA. Both the ways of justifying aid and explaining its rationales show more striking and explicit differences than initially anticipated.

2. Despite similar goals and modalities—conflict management, poverty reduction, financing of global public goods—none of these bring the four donors together in such a way as to pave the way for other donors.

3. Aside from BMGF (and to some extent the UK), the conditions for successful ODA are not intrinsic to aid itself. By 2030, aid will be dependent on policies or initiatives that do not fall under the heading of ODA, as we know it today. Although this relationship has always existed to some degree, such dependency has been amplified by the 2030 Agenda and the fragile nature of contemporary discourse on ODA.

4. These discourses contain a few blind spots that need to be enlightened. These include the role that funding (ODA and non-ODA) plays in achieving the targeted goals, the sustainability of this funding if subscribed as debt, and the public/private sharing of responsibilities, especially when it comes to sharing risk. These blind spots are a second factor of weakness in the discourses justifying ODA.

1. Reference to the OECD report (2015a) cannot be used here since it involves the reasons for and impact of aid as perceived by the administration of recipient countries, with no referral to the direct users of ODA.
5. The 2030 Agenda currently under discussion is an agenda of financial offerings. This predominance of a discourse focusing on the “offering” stems from the accounting equation behind the Agenda’s stupendous financing needs—the trillions to be found at all costs—whose terms date back to the first work of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing. Vital to fixing the orders of magnitude, the estimations of aggregate needs have the disadvantage of hiding, for the moment, the emergence of national preferences and the South’s narratives on the subject. This is a third weakness in the discourses on ODA.

6. From the comparison between the French discourse and the allocation choices for bilateral ODA, it should be pointed out that the main issues prioritised by France only partially reflect the discourse. The “economic development” issue received most funding over the period 2011–2014, accounting for around 30% of ODA commitments. The preponderant share for “economic development” in this ODA allocation covers hefty commitments in the road, rail and air transport sectors (for an average of 1 billion dollars over the period), for “production” (access to financing and banking services, development of agricultural supply chains), “energy distribution” (power transmission lines) and “development and urban management” (improving land tenure security or support for local authorities).

7. Spending on peacekeeping and stability remains low in the French bilateral ODA portfolio, as does, to a lesser extent, spending on “social justice”. However, these issues correspond to areas in which France has undeniable expertise – be it in education (state), social protection, strengthening financial governance and mobilising fiscal resources. It could be argued that France responds to these needs in priority via multilateral channels, but this would need to be substantiated and confirmed by estimating the contribution earmarked and overseen by France through the relevant multilateral channels. This will be the subject of a further study.

In sections 1 to 5 below, we present the national narratives on the reasons for aid as they can be read in documents or on the official websites of governments and development agencies or departments of the United Kingdom, Germany, France and China. We have also added speeches and documents available on the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s website. In this paper, we quote them verbatim in order to avoid any interpretative bias. In section 6, we deepen the comparison between the actual allocation of French aid and its allocation as can be surmised from the discourses that serve to justify it. Section 7 concludes by identifying various points on which ODA purveyors need to remain vigilant in order to strengthen its contribution and value-added by 2030.


Box 1. What the term “aid” encompasses in this paper

Several different definitions are mentioned by the donors:
- Official development assistance (ODA) strictly speaking, as defined by the OECD’s DAC, that is, all contributions of concessional public resources to developing countries (or multilateral institutions) with the main objective of promoting economic development and welfare.7
- Cooperation and international development policies: in other words, policies intended to improve the economic and social welfare of populations in developing countries; this term includes but is not limited to the contribution of resources.
- Finance for development, which has no single definition: this term denotes the array of financing options available to developing countries in view of their economic, social and environmental development; these financing options can be either public or private, national or international.8

Here, the term “aid” encompasses the first two definitions.

Source: OECD

Box 2. The Addis Ababa Agreement on Financing for Development

- The Addis-Ababa Action Agenda marks a turning point in the history of development finance. The novelty compared to the Monterrey Consensus, which preceded it, lies in the concomitance of at least four elements:
  - Revived ambitions: complete the Millennium Development Goals, integrate the climate objective into the development agenda, promote sustainable economic models.
  - The agreement on a better sharing of tasks among the actors: an increasing role for the private sector, sub-national government, civil society, South-South cooperation and development finance institutions.
  - Recognition of the opportunity of using a broader array of tools: loan-grant blending, vertical funds, innovative financing, risk sharing, guarantees, etc.
  - The emergence of new methods of learning to better integrate the three preceding elements: platforms, experience-sharing, multi-stakeholder collaboration, networking.

Source: IDDRI

8. Idem.
1. FIRST NARRATIVE: BORN OF WAR, ODA WILL ONLY DISAPPEAR WITH PEACE (UNITED KINGDOM)

1.1. The affirmation of British self-interest

Championing the international cause to eradicate extreme poverty and reputed for its “Make Poverty History” initiative, which received support from the highest levels of government, the United Kingdom substantially revised its priorities in 2015 at the height of the “migrant crisis”, to use the term coined by the British press. This was the same year that the run of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) came to a close.

“This strategy outlines our new approach to aid spending that we believe will command public confidence. The world is changing, and our strategy on aid needs to change with it.” (HM Treasury and DFID, 2015, p.3)

While the eradication of extreme poverty remains one of the hallmarks of British development policy, its main focus is on the questions of instability, insecurity and conflict (Box 3).

Box 3. The four strategic objectives of British ODA

- **Strengthening global peace, security and governance**: the government will invest more to tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict, and to tackle crime and corruption. This is fundamental to poverty reduction overseas, and will also strengthen our own national security at home.
- **Strengthening resilience and response to crises**: this includes more support for ongoing crises including that in Syria and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, more science and technology spend on global public health risks such as antimicrobial resistance, and support for efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
- **Promoting global prosperity**: the government will use Official Development Assistance (ODA) to promote economic development and prosperity in the developing world. This will contribute to the reduction of poverty and also strengthen UK trade and investment opportunities around the world.
- **Tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable**: the government will strive to eliminate extreme poverty by 2030, and support the world’s poorest.


The reasons for this change lie in four successive arguments:

- The world faces new challenges. These challenges affect both the world’s poorest and people in the UK.
- Global insecurity is rising and the risk of conflict in previously stable parts of the world is increasing.
- Migration is a global challenge. Instability, extremism and conflict in the Middle East and Africa have displaced millions of people, with many having sought to travel to Europe. It has created a serious humanitarian challenge, which is creating pressures across the European Union.
- Poverty is falling—but maintaining this trend will depend on continued strong economic growth. In the future, extreme poverty is likely to be concentrated in fragile countries. (ibid., p. 7; authors’ emphasis)

Anticipating the future geography of extreme poverty, the United Kingdom connects its latest security objectives to those more typical of the Blair, Brown and Cameron years focusing on the MDGs—and more specifically on poverty reduction. This update of the bi-partisan MDG Agenda can be interpreted as continuity in the logic of prioritisation and concentration. A continuity also in the idea that if some of the objectives that are seen as cornerstones of the Development Agenda were to fail, the whole structure of the Agenda would be at risk of collapse.

“Risks” and “threats” are each cited more than ten times in the United Kingdom’s strategic reference document. The word “value” hardly ever appears—except as value for money and in the Commonwealth’s focus on promoting “democratic values”. The word “cooperation” is never mentioned, and neither is the term “transformation”, which has shot to the top of the 2030 Agenda.

“National interest” is now the linchpin of British ODA—the number of times the term occurs is impressive. The title of the framework document is in itself unambiguous: “Tackling global challenges in the national interest”. (Authors’ emphasis). The (achieved) objective of 0.7% is itself justified in view of national interest and power:

> The UK leads the world on international development, and has kept its promises on aid (p. 5). We firmly believe that spending 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on international development—alongside our commitment to spend 2% on defence—means our country walking taller in the world (ibid., p. 3).

Finally, what should not be overlooked is the statement that aid must ultimately lead to its own disappearance.

We are ending the need for aid by building peaceful and stable societies, creating jobs and strong economies, fighting corruption, unlocking the potential of girls and women, tackling...
climate change and helping to save lives when humanitarian emergencies hit. We are doing this because it is both the right thing to do and firmly in Britain’s national interest. (DFID website; authors’ emphasis)

Born in the post-war years to ensure security—British aid is returning to its roots and promises to disappear in a world of peace.

1.2. The hallmarks of leadership: fragile States, governance and sustainable finance

A particularly useful document for identifying the British “hallmark” regarding the resources mobilized and the priorities, in addition to the discourse on the objectives just mentioned, lies in the consultation headed by the British Parliament’s International Development Committee.10 Unless otherwise mentioned, the quotations below are from this report.

The British Parliament identifies three areas of excellence for the United Kingdom, all of which stem from the means used to implement the 2030 Agenda. In order of appearance—in the body of the report and not in the executive summary, which changes the order and prioritizes the fight against corruption ahead of ODA—we find the “vital role” played by ODA, the fight against corruption and tax evasion, and the maximising of capital markets with, interestingly, mention of the London Stock Exchange. To a lesser extent, there is also support for private investment through the Commonwealth Development Corporation—re-capitalised in 2015—and the Prosperity Fund to complete the United Kingdom’s “2030 hallmarks” justifying ODA.

First and foremost, ODA is indispensable—as is the United Kingdom since it is called on to use its influence to support and increase the commitment of other donors:

Although ODA is just part of the solution to raising development finance for the SDGs, it still plays a vital role, particularly for the poorest countries. According to the OECD, “ODA remains the biggest financial flow in fragile states. ... As a respected leader in the donor community, the UK Government should continue to use its influence to persuade other countries to carry more of the burden.”

ODA is a hallmark of the United Kingdom even though, according to the British Government’s statements cited in the section above, the 2030 Agenda goes “beyond aid”.

It is not the only one. In its report, Parliament recalls that, following the release of the Panama Papers in March 2016, the British Government launched a series of initiatives to counter tax evasion and financial secrecy. The report also commends the Anti-Corruption Summit in London (12 May 2016) initiated by the prime minister, again as much for the response it brought as for who was behind it:

We recognise the impact of tax evasion on developing countries’ ability to raise revenues and welcome the Prime Minister’s decision to host the recent Anti-Corruption Summit in London, positioning the UK as a leader in this debate...We welcome the Addis Tax Initiative and the Government’s strong commitment to supporting the development of effective tax systems in some of the world’s poorest countries. Prioritising assistance to developing countries, particularly Least Developed Countries, in implementing effective tax collection systems will be crucial in enabling countries to raise the revenue needed to implement the SDGs. (p. 18)

Making private finance “sustainable” is the third driver foregrounded for achieving the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda, and unravel the magic formula for moving from billions (of ODA) to the trillions needed. The gradual alignment of finance with climate objectives and the symbolic power of Carney’s London speech about the risk that the “carbon bubble” is creating for major financial centres propel a similar search for the alignment of financial practices with the social or societal interests embodied in the SDGs. The report mentions one fund manager who points out that:

The Government is already taking action to harness the markets to support sustainable development, highlighting that, “HM Treasury has recently launched, in conjunction with the City of London, a Green Finance Initiative to advance proposals on how to increase and incentivise private sector finance in the green economy”. (p. 21)

9. On the security-related origins of aid, see for example the still relevant work of Carbonnier (2010), Brainard (2006), and Charnoz and Severino (2007).


Parliament replies: “There is no reason why these efforts could not be expanded within the framework of the SDGs.” (p. 21)

We recognise the potential—and need—to harness the trillions of dollars tied up in the capital markets to achieve the SDGs. London is the world’s leading financial centre, meaning that the UK Government is in a strong and unique position to look at how this could be done. (p. 21) … To harness the finance tied up in capital markets, DFID and other relevant government departments should also enter into discussions with the London Stock Exchange and the City of London to explore how they might work together to create better incentives for sustainable development in the capital markets. (p. 3)

2. SECOND NARRATIVE: GIFT AND COUNTER-GIFT—PROSPERITY GOES HAND IN HAND WITH OBLIGATIONS (GERMANY)

2.1. One world, our responsibility

The strategic documents make for fascinating reading, as the national narratives are very different both in tone and in substance. The case of Germany shows us motives and objectives that differ starkly from those of the United Kingdom. While both nations draw on the historic roots of aid—which emerged post-war to rebuild Europe and safeguard against Soviet influence—and Germany underlines the special relationship that it has developed with this instrument. As a former beneficiary of aid, Germany conceives that it carries some obligations in exchange, as in some kind of system of gift/counter-gift. Moreover, Germany has acquired first-hand experience in the virtues of aid: it was surely under the effects of the Marshall Plan that the country was able to move swiftly from the status of recipient, in 1961, to that of donor, and open the first Ministry of Development in Europe.

Germany was itself once a recipient of international aid programmes. The country was devastated during the Second World War and subsequently received billions of dollars in support from the United States under the Marshall Plan. It taught the German population how important and successful aid can be. The prosperity and values that are characteristic of today’s Germany are also a consequence of this forward-looking post-war policy. And, not least, it is this experience that induced the German government to take on an active role in regard to development policy and, in 1961, to become first country in Europe to establish a development ministry.22

Other marked differences characterise the British and German cases. Germany insists on the consequences of globalisation—an interconnected world that creates the need for international cooperation and the delivery of global responses to global challenges.

Today, our lives are much more interconnected with those of people living on other continents than ever before. We have many advantages because of that. However, it also means that we have greater responsibility than previous generations, because the international community is facing challenges for which it needs to find global solutions. Radical changes need to be made—at global level and as soon as possible.

Visibly, aid is only one response among many that lie outside of the world of aid—responses that are either not forthcoming or insufficient (“Radical changes need to be made—at global level”). Germany, unlike the United Kingdom, insists on the transformations required in light of the new magnitude of the challenges, even if the word “transformation” is not cited as such—“radical changes” is on a similar note. Another notable difference is that Germany sets little store by “national interest”. Not that aid is conceived from a purely altruistic point of view,13 but what is foregrounded is the general interest—rarely Germany’s interest, which is never worded as such in the texts. Thus, after stating a series of general objectives that more or less foreshadow the SDGs:

The German government is actively engaged, in close cooperation with the international community, in combating poverty, securing food, establishing peace, freedom, democracy and human rights, shaping globalisation in a socially equitable manner, and preserving the environment and natural resources.

Germany specifies the beneficiaries of ODA:

Development cooperation is one of the most important instruments for achieving these goals. The German government regards it as an

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13. In its 14th report on development policy, the German Government specifies that bilateral aid allocated by BMZ must meet four criteria: governance performance in partner countries, poverty and needs, Germany’s comparative advantage with respect to other donors, and “German interests” which are immediately qualified as “(including strategic partnerships and global environmental goods)”. (BMZ, 2013, p. 26).
imperative of humanity and of reason. Development cooperation guarantees a future for people in developing countries—and thus for everyone else, too.” (Authors’ emphasis).

“Everyone else” includes Germany but is not the same as “national interest”. German ODA responds to an obligation—that of holding its own and helping to resolve the world’s problems, in line with its human and financial means, including those brought on by its involvement in the agenda and reform of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the G7 or the G20. As in the British case, the title of the flagship report on ODA is emblematic here: One world. Our responsibility.

2.2. Priorities: human rights, institutional reform and climate finance

In the document submitted to the High-Level Political Forum in view of the first meeting on the progress made towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, Germany points out that in terms of volume ODA is one of its hallmarks, even if it cannot claim to have reached the 0.7% of GNI.14

Germany’s ODA (Official Development Assistance) has increased steadily in recent years; the OECD’s latest ODA estimate for 2015 shows continual increases to around 16.0 billion euros. That makes Germany the third-largest donor in absolute figures; Germany’s ODA rose from 0.38% of gross national income (GNI) in 2013, to 0.42% of GNI in 2014 and 0.52% of GNI in 2015. About 0.09 percentage points of the increase recorded between 2014 and 2015 were accounted for by the costs of providing for refugees in Germany, some of which costs are classified as ODA. Spending on development cooperation continues to be one of the German Government’s top priorities. It has increased its spending several times in recent years and a further rise is planned for 2017. (Authors’ emphasis)

The increase in Germany’s ODA spending in 2015 was in fact almost entirely due to its actions to cope with migrants, but raises doubts as to whether this increase will continue and criticisms of the confusion between internal security and development.15

Yet Germany has nonetheless demonstrated that it knows how to make the necessary means available when faced with the general objectives of responsibility and the solidarity of “gift and counter-gift” mentioned in the first section. As it benefited from ODA and is today in a position to pass that benefit on to others, Germany is duty bound to be a high-ranking donor. Likewise, because, since the early post-war years and reunification, German families are well aware of what it means to be displaced and welcomed and able to offer hospitality, this hospitality is a due. There is an undeniable coherence between the country’s discourse on the ends and its mobilisation of the means.

All the same, our reading seems to indicate that Germany’s main “2030 hallmark” lies in its efforts to leverage the country’s voice and influence within the pluri-lateral and multilateral institutions in favour of developing countries. A lightly stamped hallmark, but a hallmark all the same. Development makes headway on the basis of rules and law, and it is by strengthening the former, by firming up the latter to the benefit of developing countries that German cooperation policy finds the arguments that mark it out and thus justify its policy.

The rising need for common global action calls for strong and united action on the part of multilateral cooperation, with the goal of improving the international framework for sustainable development, gearing multilateral organisations to the promotion of sustainable development around the globe, and ensuring that they make the best possible use of their comparative advantages. In its capacity as a member of the United Nations, the EU and the OECD, as well as other international organisations, and as one of largest shareholders in the World Bank and regional development banks, Germany is supporting the necessary reform and strategy processes within these organisations. Without a strong and efficient United Nations, there can be no solution to global problems. Germany is actively supporting the reform of the UN development system and is pushing for an anchoring of reform projects within the scope of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review negotiations (authors’ emphasis).

The second hallmark lies in the promotion of human rights, which is fundamentally inseparable from the German cooperation and development policy.

Respecting, protecting and safeguarding human rights are among the criteria that determine the nature and extent of Germany’s development cooperation with a partner country. Through the human rights strategy it published


15. Oxfam is probably one of the most virulent organisations on this issue. See for example: https://www.eu-activ.fr/section/aide-au-développement/interview/weekend-or-monoxfam-our-red-lines-on-securitisation-and-conditionality-of-eu-aid/
In May 2011, the BMZ is operationalising the human rights-based approach systematically in its work. In accordance with the strategy, human rights standards and principles are included when preparing sector, regional and country strategies, as well as joint donor strategies. Germany is thus an international leader in this field16 (authors’ emphasis).

Note that it is with reference to protecting human rights that health (including rights to sexual and reproductive health) appears among Germany distinctive characteristics (“Health—A human right” to cite the catchphrase of BMZ).

Finally, the commitment to climate matters stands as Germany’s final hallmark, in a corpus of texts where any reference to an explicit posture of champion is extremely rare—the German Government’s discourse on this is striking above all for its modesty.

In 2014, the German government committed a total of more than 2,344 billion euros in official budget funds for climate change mitigation and adaptation. About 85 per cent of this sum came from the BMZ’s budget. Since 2005, Germany’s commitments have grown almost fivefold (from 471 million euros at the time), and in 2014 Germany became, for the first time, the largest bilateral donor of climate finance. (Authors’ emphasis)

Germany is leading the way:

In 2009, the world’s industrialised countries made a commitment to provide, from 2020, an annual 100 billion US dollars from public and private sources for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries....In order to further increase confidence in international climate finance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced in May 2015 that the German government is planning to double German climate finance by 2020. In making that announcement, Germany led the way.... With this increase and the additional private funding that can be mobilised as a result, the target of 100 billion dollars from 2020 onwards is now within reach. Germany’s share in that amount would be about ten per cent (authors’ emphasis).

The “climate” hallmark is a further addition to the first hallmark, and stamped by Germany alongside those of other institutions:

Within the G7, Germany is pushing for the ambitious implementation of the SDGs and, under the German Presidency in 2015, made an important contribution with its commitment to climate change mitigation: the G7 is aiming to decarbonise the global economy by the end of this century and put its energy sector on a new footing by 2050 in order to limit global warming to well below 2° Celsius, ideally to 1.5° Celsius. The G7 states are also aiming to apply labour, social and environmental standards more rigorously in global supply chains and have set themselves the goal to free 500 million people in developing countries and emerging economies from hunger and malnutrition by 2030.

Also within the framework of the G20, the German Government is pushing for the across-the-board implementation of the SDGs, and is urging all member states to engage more strongly at national level, for example through national sustainable development strategies. The German Government will translate this into more specific terms in the course of the German Presidency in 2017 and will push for a stronger alignment of the G20’s work with the 2030 Agenda.

3. THIRD NARRATIVE: ODA FORESHADOWS GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICIES (FRANCE)

3.1. Correcting the failings of globalisation

The major concern for France, since it was expressed in its vision of international cooperation (MAE, 2011), is steering globalisation and managing interdependencies. This vision is also presented in the Framework Act of 2014, although with less emphasis.

France’s development and international solidarity policy has the ambition to better steer a globalisation that upholds humanist values.17

For what reason? Because after ten years of record global growth:

Worldwide, it is becoming clear that the benefits of globalisation are coming up against a


We can also mention here the programmatic title of the book Mieux gérer la mondialisation? L’aide publique au développement, by Aurélien Lechevallier, Jennifer Moreau and François Pacquement, Editions Ellipses, 2007.
lack of governance and collective action. Aspirations for a more equitable growth respectful of individual rights, sustainability and global public goods call for the implementation of global policies. These policies need to give meaningful direction to this ongoing globalisation in order to maximise its benefits—also for developing countries—more effectively manage the upheavals it causes and make sure that it will not lead humanity into an impasse. (MAE 2011, p. 6, authors’ emphasis)

French ODA can be read implicitly as an instrument at the service of a project offering an alternative to liberal liberalisation (“liberal” in the French sense of the term) embodied in the Washington Consensus and the structural adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s. French ODA can thus be read in the shadow of Keynes and Hirschman, and the conviction that even a rich world glutted with savings cannot count on the invisible hand of capital markets to produce the goods and services essential to the prosperity of nations.

French aid can also be read explicitly as an instrument of cooperation that cannot be limited to financial cooperation—a cooperation devoted to the elaboration of global public policies vital to the production of global public goods. The first ODA opted for resistance, the second tells a “positive story” of international cooperation between liberal nations (this time in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term “liberal”, to further complicate matters) as formulated during the Clinton (Bill)–Blair–Schröder–Jospin years, between the fall of the Berlin Wall and that of Manhattan’s towers.

Whether making an implicit or explicit reading of them, the goals of French ODA are explicitly political—in the sense of public policies, which it intends to strengthen in the recipient countries.

“Development requires a State with a strategic approach, able to invest in the long term while maintaining social consensus.” 18

Also a strengthening within the global space, to take one of Bertrand Badie’s expressions.

“In a universal perspective, France intends to foster the emergence of global public policies, notably through its action in the international arenas (United Nations organisations, Bretton Woods institutions, G8 and G20) and through its participation in many vertical funds.” 19

The similarities with Germany are as striking as the dissimilarities with the United Kingdom: the insistence on international cooperation (“global policy” replaces the German “global solutions”, but this is with semantic nuance), management of interdependencies—and again, unlike the British case, a very broad array of objectives. The objectives of the development policy outlined in Act No. 2014-773 are extremely general:

France implements a development and international solidarity policy that has the general objective of promoting sustainable development in developing countries, while at the same time participating in the international effort to fight against extreme poverty and to reduce inequalities. 20

The italicised in bold emphasis is ours, to signal the deliberate difference from the British case: France maintains the goal of poverty reduction but links it up to reducing inequalities. This latter objective was intensely debated during the SDGs negotiations and was, as is known, ultimately integrated against the initial wishes of the United Kingdom and the United States. 19

This policy simultaneously covers four large areas: Promotion of peace, stability, human rights and equality between women and men… Equity, social justice and human development… Sustainable economic development generating high levels of employment… Preservation of the environment and global public goods (RF, 2014).

Although the objectives suffer from this global ambition given the magnitude of the task, what is nonetheless clear is that ODA cannot claim to reach them by itself. What was cryptic in the German case is made explicit here:

ODA alone, which represents 0.2% of the world’s income, cannot meet the challenges of development; the challenge of mobilising resources other than aid is thus essential. In this perspective, France wishes to continue promoting the growth of fiscal resources in developing countries through strengthened support to tax administrations, as well as private, local and international investment. (RF, 2014).

ODA’s role of a “catalyst” for other sources of finance (private, public, international or domestic) and its “leverage effect” are mentioned on several occasions, running through French discourse both before and after the 2015 Addis Ababa Conference. This role of catalyst and leverage that French ODA

is expected to play belongs to a vision, which is not strictly financial, of international cooperation whose end goal is to build global policies.

As part of an “overall development approach” where aid is but one lever among others, French ODA serves a political project that continues to give the State—the Nation State, strategist State, Financing State—a preponderant role in the development process, in North and South alike, greater than the absolute minimum of correcting market failings.

3.2. “Swiss knife” ODA: differentiation and co-benefits

French strategy for resource distribution, which is part of the justification and hallmark of its aid, is based on a geographic typology comprising four kinds of partnerships depending on the types of country, the issues involved and the forms of action. The 16 priority poor countries (PPCs) concentrate French solidarity efforts in the form of grant funding to objectives covering a large spectrum of sustainable development. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and neighbouring countries in the South and East Mediterranean account for 85% of the French State’s financial effort to development of all kinds: grants, budget aid, subsidised and non-subsidised loans, sovereign and non-sovereign loans, equity investments, guarantees and other innovative finance for SSA; loans to countries in the South and East Mediterranean. Countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile contexts that are not included among the PPCs, “are given specific attention” and financial assistance with a preference for grants. Finally the rest of the world, notably countries in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean most of which are middle-income countries, receive financial flows of little or no cost to the governments (excluding technical expertise). French “differentiation” thus combines three dimensions—geographic, economic and thematic.

The changes that the 2030 Agenda might induce to the differentiated approach characterising French ODA are still a matter of speculation insofar as the strategic documents establishing France’s role, comparative advantage and its priorities in implementing the Agenda are currently being drafted. The publication of the French Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) “Quelles nouvelles orientations et priorités pour la politique française de coopération internationale dans le cadre de l’agenda 2030 du développement durable?” (“What new orientations and priorities for French international cooperation policy under the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda?”) brings responses that are still maturing, according to the ministers and agency directors consulted on the subject. We have thus fallen back on documents that for the most part were written before the adoption of the SDGs, although many of these were drafted with the SDGs in mind. For want of a strategic document highlighting the value added of French ODA in the context of the 2030 Agenda, we will propose, in a necessarily speculative manner, the possible hallmarks that France could take on.

Before the preparation for COP21 and its bid to make this a success, France had wanted to forge an “international ‘climate’ identity”, to reprise the words of the “2012-2016 Climate and Development Intervention Framework” (CIT) of the Agence Française de Développement Group. Underlining that “Climate change has become central to AFD’s economic model”, the CIT recalls that “through AFD, France is one of the most important actors in financing the fight against climate change”. The text points out (highlighting 2010 data) that “this level of commitments—about 10 percent of all international climate-related aid—positions AFD as a major fighter of climate change in developing countries.” “AFD has developed industry-standard methods and tools to measure the impact of climate-related funding”, which are more effective that the Rio markers, whose shortcomings are well known. On its website, AFD presents itself as “qualitative-ly and quantitatively, a major innovative player in international ‘climate’ finance, notably due to the financing methods and instruments used”.

Noting that “AFD has gradually become a recognized French and international player” in financing the fight against climate change, the CIT document underlines that “AFD has significant comparative advantages when it comes to financing the fight against climate change in developing countries”. These include the critical mass reached by its interventions, the availability of flexible and diversified tools, know-how and innovation, knowledge of the field and the capacity to mobilise expertise. Although derided at times

for its low level of grant funding, “in this context, AFD can continue expanding its role as a leading climate financier, by using loans primarily and by highly leveraging France’s and the international community’s resources cost-effectively.”

To affirm its “climate’ identity” and since the release of the note of the CIT, AFD has committed to maintaining its annual average “climate” allocations in the medium term at 50% of total AFD allocations to foreign States, and Proparco’s annual allocations at 30%. The President of the Republic has “wished to increase the Agence française de développement (AFD) Group’s funding for sustainable development by 4 billion euros by 2020, including 2 billion to be devoted to climate challenges. In parallel, an additional 400 million will be allocated to the most fragile countries in the form of grants over the same timeline. These new means of implementing French development policy will be defined at the meeting of the Interministerial Committee on International Cooperation and Development in November 2016. This is the direction of France’s effort to re-engage with an upward trajectory of official development aid.”

The idea of climate “co-benefit” brings a nuance to what an over-hasty reading might seem to be portfolio specialisation in the energy transition. The ambition is to show the way towards a portfolio that must ultimately fully contribute to the transformation to an economic and social development compatible with the climate challenges and the finite nature of resources.

The “climate” hallmark of French ODA and the comparative advantage that this foregrounds hide a second hallmark: the great flexibility and variety of financing instruments. As banal as this justification may seem, it is not worthless: one of the key characteristics of French aid within the ecosystem of sustainable development financing is the fact that it has a dedicated banking group with a wide range of financing modalities enabling it to offer sovereign and non-sovereign loans, subsidised or not, and allocate (certainly meagre) grants funding.

In its Memorandum on cooperation policy, France underlines one of the features of French strategy that “aims to combine public development aid with other sources of development finance in a complementary approach”, recalling that “it represents amounts that are substantially lower than the other sources in many countries”. It foregrounds its “toolbox”, which can offer “support tailored to the needs and technical, financial and institutional capacities of each partner”, including financing for local authorities and innovative financing—an area in which France has a certain reputation.

With no disclaimer to French cutlers, the ODA hallmark is a little like a multi-purpose Swiss knife. It is all the more compelling when associated with the previous hallmark, which eliminates the distinction between “development” and “climate” to advocate new development models that from a pragmatic stance inevitably require an extremely broad panoply of instruments that are not limited to grants. Disconnected from the first hallmark, the “instrumental” hallmark of French ODA (“Swiss-knife” aid) is somewhat blurred: it does not basically distinguish French ODA from the ODA of countries that also have development banks—Germany, Japan, Italy—without forgetting the multilateral banks and funding agencies in developing countries.

Other hallmarks are possible, and the CICID meeting in November 2016 and the announced rapprochement between AFD and the CDC could give France the chance to test or confirm these. We mention them very briefly here as they are outside the scope of our analysis of existing discourses and thus simply hypothetical. Education (state), and expertise in social sectors and specifically social protection, with experience in financing in countries with very diverse income levels such as Colombia or Cambodia, are all assets that France could move forward in the context of a 2030 Agenda judged to be socially progressive. The double hallmark of a toolbox and an objective in line with a “French” vision of a development model (here a social model) would doubtless be as acceptable as the AFD’s development-climate duo.

25. With nearly €2,648 billion “climate” funding approvals granted to developing countries in 2015, AFD (excluding Proparco) reached a level of 55% (against 53% in 2014) of “climate” allocations, and for the second time exceeded its annual objective 50% fixed in its climate-development strategy.


4. FOURTH NARRATIVE: AID TO SERVE A PROJECT FOR EMANCIPATION (CHINA)

Rendering the official Chinese discourse on aid and describing China's hallmark proved more sensitive than was the case for the United Kingdom, France and Germany. In fact, we have very few documentary sources for China. All in all, there are two official documents that enabled us to describe the principles and priorities for Chinese aid. The first, the White Paper on Foreign Aid dates back to 2011. The second, published in 2014, is a revised version of the first. Both these white papers are in line with the 8 key principles of Chinese aid stated by the first Premier Zhou Enlai on his visit to Ghana in 1964 (Box 4). We draw on these two documents to clarify the Chinese Government’s justifications for development aid. We will complete this reading with an analysis of the keys to Chinese aid allocation in order to clearly describe its hallmark.

Box 4. The eight principles of Chinese aid, stated in 1964

1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual.
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development.
5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.
6. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.
7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.
8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

In its preamble, the 2011 document underlines the specific character of Chinese aid:

Adhering to equality and mutual benefit, stressing substantial results, and keeping pace with the times without imposing any political conditions on recipient countries, China's foreign aid has emerged as a model with its own characteristics (People’s Republic of China, 2011; authors’ emphasis in bold).

This specificity is developed at length in the revised 2014 document; what comes to light when reading between lines is the will to be different from the previous practices of ODA donor over the years:

When providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their right to independently choosing their own paths and models of development. The basic principles China upholds in providing foreign assistance are mutual respect, equality, keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win. (People’s Republic of China, 2014).

“Not interfering in the internal affairs” and “not imposing any political conditions” are two principles found in the Beijing Declaration from the Forum on Cooperation between China and Africa (2000): “[t]he politicization of human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionalities on economic assistance should be vigorously opposed.”

4.1. Aid justified by the means, rather than the ends

To summarise the two White Papers, Chinese assistance involves first and foremost two aspects contained in a single sentence: continuity in a certain way of operating (the basic principles). These principles are detailed in the first chapter of the 2011 document. It is first underlined that Chinese assistance is part of reciprocal South-South collaboration. This may be obvious, but it is worth recalling it:

As development remains an arduous and long-standing task, China’s foreign aid falls into the category of South-South cooperation and is mutual help between developing countries (People’s Republic of China, 2011).

In China’s cooperation project, the first feature – which may be understood as an objective – is autonomy. Although this is not absent from the discourses of the DAC donors (notably that of the United Kingdom as we saw earlier), the overriding ambition is that of endogenous and “independent” development:

Unremittingly helping recipient countries build up their self-development capacity. Practice has proved that a country’s development depends mainly on its own strength. In providing foreign aid, China does its best to help recipient countries to foster local personnel and technical forces, build infrastructure, and develop and use domestic resources, so as to lay a foundation for future development and embarkation on the road of self-reliance and independent development (People’s Republic of China, 2011).

A second feature is also somewhat absent from the discourses of the other donors, at least framed in the same terms. This is pragmatism, realism and measure. China must not be asked to do things that are beyond what it can do: assistance is provided in line with China’s abilities, once national conditions have been taken into account:

Remaining realistic while striving for the best. China provides foreign aid within the reach of its abilities in accordance with its national conditions. Giving full play to its comparative advantages, China does its utmost to tailor its aid to the actual needs of recipient countries (People’s Republic of China, 2011).

We should note the term “comparative advantages”, which is a leitmotif of the DAC’s aid effectiveness, although of course there is no mention made of the DAC.

The final outstanding feature of Chinese cooperation is invariably found in Chinese policies. This involves innovation and learning; China learns by trial and error. This has proved the case, in recent times, of its carbon markets, but also of a broad range of public policy instruments:

Keeping pace with the times and paying attention to reform and innovation. China adapts its foreign aid to the development of both domestic and international situations, pays attention to summarizing experiences, makes innovations in the field of foreign aid, and promptly adjusts and reforms the management mechanism, so as to constantly improve its foreign aid work (People’s Republic of China, 2011).

Accused of conservatism and of reproducing on the ground all the shortcomings of tied aid or predatory aid when it comes to natural resources, China sets out in its key principles a highly “modern” project akin to the interpretation of modernity that the 2030 Agenda suggests to us: assistance centred around comparative advantages, not claiming to know the perfect solutions for development, mindful of the autonomy of sovereign States in the choice of their objectives and pathways (here “models”), and finally part of an innovation and learning process. What transpires in this Chinese modernity is the political project that has been a steady through-line since 1964: make assistance and cooperation into tools for emancipation from the former colonial powers – the project for independence and self-reliance needs to be understood within the context in which it was born: that of a counter-project to the DAC project, which carries the burden of its donors’ colonial history.

4.2. Priority set on business and infrastructure

Half of China’s assistance is in the form of concessional loans channelled through the Export-Import Bank of China; the other half comprises grants and interest-free loans. The grants come from many state departments and ministries, including the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) which is in charge of zero-interest loans. China’s multilateral assistance accounts for only 6% of total assistance, estimated at USD 5 billion a year, which is the amount of export credit given by China to the developing countries it partners with (Kitano, 2016). The fact that Chinese assistance is associated with the Ministry of Commerce is unique: in the other DAC countries, Ministry for Foreign Affairs oversees the strategic programming of assistance, sometimes jointly with the Ministry for Finance and the Economy. Assistance is of use to Chinese trade policy and vice versa. So far, Chinese assistance has not been the subject of any legislation submitted for approval by the Congress.

Sectoral allocation is one of the hallmarks of Chinese assistance. If we look at the breakdown of concessional loans as reported in the 2014 document (RPC, 2014), the main items financed are “infrastructure” (61%), “energy and resources” (8.9%) and “industry” (16.1%), far ahead of agriculture (4.3%). If “public facilities” (3.2%) are added to “infrastructure” and “industry”, this yields a concessional loan portfolio 80% of which is devoted to infrastructure in the broadest sense.
5. FIFTH NARRATIVE: AID IS ESSENTIAL (BMGF)

The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) has for almost 20 years provided alternative and additional financing to the ODA flows of DAC member states, disbursing annually an amount comparable to that of many official donors ($3.6 billion according to OECD preliminary data in 2015).

In a 2011 report to G20 leaders\(^\text{31}\), Bill Gates explains and emphasises the vital role of development assistance:

*Especially in hard times, some people will say rich countries should cut their ODA. They should not. Not only because they have made promises, but also because important pieces of the development agenda won’t be addressed without assistance. ODA spurs innovation by funding pilot projects that poor countries would not undertake themselves. It also pays for global public goods like scientific research. Finally, people in very poor countries will continue to depend on assistance for their survival for the foreseeable future.*

Setting aside the issue of moral imperative and the obligation to honour promises that have not always been kept by many donors (0.7% of gross national income spent on ODA), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has put forth in its statement three justifications for aid: innovation, scientific research and poverty reduction, the first two being means that contribute to the third consideration which is an overarching goal.

5.1. Extreme poverty, an ongoing justification for aid

Even though there will be fewer and fewer poor countries over time, extreme poverty will remain, given the simple fact that the geography of poverty is changing, moving toward middle-income countries\(^\text{32}\).

*Most development agencies use a country’s average income as the main factor in deciding whether it qualifies for aid. So the countries that are crossing the threshold into middle-income status risk losing much of the aid they’ve been getting. Aid should never replace the investments that countries need to make in their own people.*

Gates stresses in his official speeches the need to better understand the situation of countries—whether poor or middle-income—and to target aid so that it has the most impact on poverty reduction. By holding to this objective from the MDGs as a keystone for its advocacy for aid—targeted aid to the very poorest serving an outcome that no other source of stable financing is able to attain—the Foundation justifies such aid by its unique qualities under the conditions in which it is, or should be, used.

*Being concessional, stable and non-profit seeking, ODA can target specific areas of need and reach the poorest and most vulnerable people.*\(^\text{34}\)

It can be understood from the above that if aid distances itself from cases of extreme poverty, it loses its comparative advantage over other sources of financing and its justification fades. Aid is unique when it is firmly aimed at the critically poor.

5.2. Financing innovation for the poorest populations

*“People who are pessimistic about the future tend to extrapolate from the present in a straight line. But innovation fundamentally shifts the trajectory of development.”*

The other argument made by Bill Gates in his report to G20 leaders is that ODA not only helps poor countries and poor people, it also spurs innovation there where it would not occur on its own: innovation far upstream to production or downstream on access and dissemination. Innovation is in and of itself a factor for transformation (in the wide sense indicated by the title of the 2030 Agenda) but also a multiplier of the impact of financial resources devoted to development. New plant varieties and vaccines have this double nature.

The slow pace of technical progress of “particular use to the poor” (to use our own terms) can be remedied, according to BMGF, with high-growth countries intervening with donors (including the Foundation) and poor countries, playing a key role in “triangular partnerships”. Conservative in goals, in the sense that these can be scaled down to


\(^{34}\) ODA Allocation and other trends in development cooperation in LDCs and other vulnerable contexts.
the initial MDG, the Foundation supports the objective of 0.7% and works to reach it, but it remains pragmatic in its modalities.

“Innovation” is frequently used to describe the Foundation’s approach. The objective of and justification for aid is not only to finance innovation but to innovate itself, through pilot and demonstration projects. It is up to so-called traditional governments and donors to replicate and scale up successful innovations with the help of the private sector.

“Some of the projects we fund will fail. We not only accept that, we expect it—because we think an essential role of philanthropy is to make bets on promising solutions that governments and businesses can’t afford to make. As we learn which bets pay off, we have to adjust our strategies and share the results so everyone can benefit.”

6. DISCOURSE VERSUS REALITY: WHAT ARE THE MAJOR STRATEGIC CHALLENGES BEING FINANCED BY FRENCH ODA?

Our approach is to compare France’s official development assistance (ODA) financing with the major strategic challenges that France has designated for assistance—in short, measure the footprint of official discourse against the yardstick of facts.

Our starting point is the French discourse. Development assistance policy supports the overall aim for a “globalisation that is better controlled and promotes humanist values” and “addresses four major challenges simultaneously: promoting peace, stability, human rights…; equity, social justice and human development…; sustainable, job-rich economic development (…); protecting the environment and global public goods” (Framework Law, 2014). To compare this to the reality on the ground, we chose to use data from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), whose statistical aggregates makes it possible to break down ODA into major challenges and to confirm (or not) the main features of France’s official “hallmark”.

Our analysis covers the period from 2011, the year in which France’s Framework Document on development cooperation was published, and 2015, which is the last year for which we have data.

6.1. Methodology

The data are derived from the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s “creditor reporting system (CRS)”. These are official ODA statistics on countries’ projects and programmes, collected by the OECD. The DAC database has the advantage of presenting incontestable figures that can be compared across countries, and offers an excellent level of granularity on development assistance.

The data relate to bilateral official development assistance (ODA). An analysis of ODA transiting through multilateral agencies will be required to complete this study. It requires considerable work to reconstruct data and methodological choices, looking at the proportion allocated by States compared to the general budget of multilateral agencies, and then the proportion allocated to the different sectors by the same agencies. This will be carried at a later stage. However, we considered that bilateral assistance was more indicative of a state’s “hallmark” than multilateral aid, which may be influenced by other contributors.

The results shown here are “commitments”, which are useful in that they reveal national choices for financing decisions. “Payments” would have indicated decisions made years ago, and generated a time lag between the official line and the facts—difficult to correct in our analysis. Nevertheless, the option to use bilateral data does not completely eliminate this lag: for the DAC, commitments correspond to the moment that financing agreements are signed with the beneficiary. The delays between granting and signing are lower than those between commitments and payments. We rely on facial values of loans (where ODA is paid in the form of loans), without using the grant element, whether the version with one-time discount rate at 10% or the version which will be in force in 2018 onwards. Our choice prevents us from interpreting ODA commitments as “efforts” but it allows us to read commitments as financial contributions meeting external financing needs, whatever its nature.

Our analysis is based on aggregates: we built a correlation table between the strategic challenges to be addressed by ODA, based on our analysis of national discourses, and the “sectors” defined by the OECD in the DAC database.


The political statements on ODA during the presidential campaign are discourses of a different nature—programmatic and electoral; they are not included here.

http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/
What rationales for international development aid? Main donors’ objectives and implications for France

Table can be found in Appendix 1. We chose the finest possible level of granularity. When a “sector” in the DAC sense straddles two challenges, we have examined the content of the “sector” on a project-by-project basis and measured the propensity of commitments for a specific challenge. For instance, it was not clear in France’s case whether the DAC’s “energy distribution” sector included projects “protecting the environment and global public goods” or projects for “economic development”. By looking through all of the projects, we were able to measure what proportion of projects to attribute to each of these two challenges.

To identify the relevant strategic challenge for each project, we used the title, description and, to a lesser extent, the DAC database “markers”, which are less reliable and precise than the description. For example, in 2015, 43% of the “energy distribution” sector could be linked with the “protecting the environment and global public goods” challenge because it combined energy efficiency and renewable energy projects, while in 2014, 99% of the “energy distribution” sector consisted of electrification and energy distribution projects, and thus belonged to the “economic development” challenge.

“Global public goods” category

Although the “global public goods” category is widely debated regarding its scope and content, we used the definition provided by France itself. The most recent definition is given in the 2014 biannual report to Parliament on France’s implementation of international development policy. As the amounts associated with this sector were less than €700,000 in 2015, less than €200,000 in 2014 and 2013, we considered them nonsignificant for our analysis.

“Social justice” challenge

The “social justice” challenge includes the following OECD sectors: education, health, population/health and reproductive health policy, social services, employment policy and administrative management, housing policy and administrative management, low-cost housing, multisector aid and management” sector (for France, 7% in 2013, 1% in 2014 and 57% in 2015) corresponds to urban development projects with climate or environment actions, for example, green or sustainable cities; and part of the “rural development” sector (for France, 6% in 2015, 17% in 2014, 0.3% in 2013, 19% in 2012 and 0.1% in 2011) corresponds to projects for the environment, use of natural resources or biodiversity.

“Economic development” challenge

The “economic development” issue includes the following OECD sectors: statistical capacity building, transport and storage, communications, energy education/training, energy research, energy generation from non-renewable sources, nuclear power plants, part of the energy distribution sector, banking and financial services, business and other services, production sectors, part of the urban development and management sector, part of the rural development sector, non-agricultural alternative development, commodity aid, and action relating to debt.

40. As the amounts associated with this sector were less than €700,000 in 2015, less than €200,000 in 2014 and 2013, we considered them nonsignificant for our analysis.

41. As the amounts associated with this sector were zero for the period 2006-2014, and less than €12,000 in 2015, we considered them nonsignificant for our analysis.

42. After a project-by-project analysis, the “energy distribution” sector was classified under the “economic development” challenge up to and including 2014. The energy distribution projects focused on power transmission and distribution lines. From 2015, 43% of the projects are classified under “protecting the environment and global public goods”, as they are projects aimed at enhancing energy efficiency or developing renewable energy sources.

43. After a project-by-project analysis, part of the urban development and management sector was assigned to the “protecting the environment and global public goods” challenge: 7% in 2013, 1% in 2014 and 57% in 2015, for climate or environmental projects, for example, green city or sustainable city projects.

44. After a project-by-project analysis, part of the “rural development” sector was assigned to the “global public good” challenge: 6% in 2015, 17% in 2014, 0.3% in 2013, 19% in 2012 and 0.1% in 2011, for climate or environmental projects such as biodiversity research projects.

45. As the sector accounted for just $53,000 in 2015, we considered it nonsignificant.

46. This sector was treated in a specific way in the second part of the analysis.
for basic social services, culture and recreation, narcotics control, social mitigation of HIV/AIDS, multisector education/training, developmental food aid/food security assistance, and refugees in donor countries.47

“Peace and stability” challenge

The “peace and stability” challenge includes the following OECD sectors: government and civil society, and humanitarian aid.

In the second part of this paper and to avoid biasing results, we removed “imputed student costs” (costs allocated for students from developing countries who are studying in France), “refugee costs” (temporary aid[48] for refugees from developing countries who come to France) and debt cancellation from the “social justice” and “economic development” challenges respectively. These three items are in fact expenses that cannot be controlled, making it impossible for us to analyse whether France had implemented its official national discourse. Moreover, “imputed student costs” and “refugee costs”, although it is authorised to report these as ODA, are expenditures whose contribution to development is contested by some donors, parliamentarians and NGOs, who consider them too far removed from aid in the field. To accurately identify what they contribute to recipient countries’ development, it would be necessary to calculate the proportion of students or refugees whose return to their country of origin (or capital transfers) is known or certain. However, this would require years of complex monitoring.

6.2. The main strategic challenges selected by France for its ODA financing only roughly reflect its official line of discourse

Comparing France’s discourse with its ODA allocation choices reveals that “economic development”, “protecting the environment and global public good” and “social justice” are, in that order, the three main challenges financed by France. Next, and in last place, comes “promoting peace, stability, human rights” (Figure 1).

It is therefore the “economic development” issue that received the most financing over the period 2011–2014, representing around 30% of ODA commitments. This issue fell behind “protecting the environment and global public goods” in 2015 but remained at a high level (USD 2 billion), equivalent to about 25% of French bilateral aid (Figure 2).

The predominance of “economic development” in ODA allocation choices is reflected in significant commitments in the road, rail or air transport sector (on average USD 1 billion over the period), the “production” sector (access to financing and banking services, development of agricultural activities), “energy distribution” (power transmission and distribution lines), and “urban development and management”, such as developing security of land tenure or supporting local authorities.49

Financing economic development through the growth of production capacities in the Global South, supporting businesses and growth is ultimately not very prominent in the allocation choices, despite a French discourse that aims to stimulate a business environment and develop the private sector (Framework Document for Development Cooperation, 2011). In decline since 2013, French financing for economic development is channelled more towards public works: particularly transport and energy distribution.

Next comes financing for protecting the environment and global public goods, which focuses

47. This sector was treated in a specific way in the second part of the analysis.
48. Aid covering the first twelve months.
49. Remember that, in this category, sustainable environmental, climate or biodiversity projects were classified under the “protecting the environment and global public goods” challenge.
on climate issues, including the climate, the environment, biodiversity, water and sanitation. Financing in these areas has been growing sharply since 2013. The trend is in step with the French discourse as stated in the Framework Law (2014) relating to the policy for development and international solidarity, whose overall aim is to foster sustainable development in developing countries, with its four economic, social, environmental and cultural components. There is also the “stamp” of a Minister Delegate for Development from the Europe Ecologie Les Verts party from 2012 to 2014. The increasing commitments for financing global public goods confirm France’s hallmark in the 2030 Agenda and corroborate the priority given to fighting climate change and the aim of increasing development projects’ climate “co-benefits”. There is also a linkage with the overarching goal of a “better controlled globalisation”.

6.3. Issues reveal more about the instruments used than official discourse

The evolution of the financing for the key areas encompassed by the French ODA discourse reveals France’s policy choices as much as its preferred instruments: the reduced amounts for “economic development” and “social justice” challenges as from 2013 can be explained by the decline in French commitments in the form of grants. The increase for “protecting the environment and global public goods” is due to the growing proportion of loans (Figures 3a, 3b, 3c).

An analysis of the geographical distribution of the “strategic challenges”—whether for protection of the environment and global goods or economic development—shows that it is the middle-income countries that mainly benefit from French assistance. This is consistent with the French discourse: with the majority of loans going to emerging countries. Although one can understand the interest of boosting the protection of the environment and global public goods in this country category—which has a low dependence on ODA and where the donors’ added value hinges on the capacity to act on biodiversity, the environment and the fight against global warming—it is worth reflecting on the absence of a clear-cut discourse acknowledging the relevance of reinforcing “economic development” in middle-income countries (Figure 4).

To sum up, the “economic development” challenge is to some extent the elephant in the room for French ODA: it accounts for a large proportion of commitments and relates to types of development such as infrastructure or transport on the one hand, and the strengthening of the private sector on the other.

This result opens—or reopens—two major debates. The first concerns the choice of countries to be assisted and how their financing needs are

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50. Remember that here we are only considering the bilateral ODA flows.
51. Due to the lack of data, we were not able to include in our analysis the changes in financing through blended instruments or facilities.
What rationales for international development aid? Main donors’ objectives and implications for France

Table 1. French bilateral ODA by major challenge (USD millions)

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<td>Global public goods</td>
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<td>4,658</td>
<td>3,773</td>
<td>2,638</td>
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<td>of which debt cancellation</td>
<td>3,889</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>1,251</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>139</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debt cancellation (%)</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social justice</td>
<td>2,747</td>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>3,055</td>
<td>3,069</td>
<td>3,098</td>
<td>3,030</td>
<td>2,746</td>
<td>2,790</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>2,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which imputed student costs &amp; refugees (%)</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>1,512</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace, stability, rule of law</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>177</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>704</td>
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<td>558</td>
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<td>1,010</td>
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<td>Administrative costs</td>
<td>330</td>
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<td>412</td>
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<td>439</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>515</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unallocated</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,443</td>
<td>8,228</td>
<td>9,875</td>
<td>9,347</td>
<td>10,993</td>
<td>9,490</td>
<td>11,383</td>
<td>8,915</td>
<td>9,071</td>
<td>8,673</td>
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Figure 3a, 3b and 3c. Global public goods (3a), Economic development financing (3b) and Social services financing flows (3c)

Figure 4. Economic development: distribution by income category (USD millions) Source: OCDE (2017).
assessed (sectoral for DAC). The disparity between discourse and reality, while not gaping, is problematic for the readability of the French ODA “hallmark”.

Secondly, it is imperative to anticipate how the allocation of French ODA financing will be affected by the key challenges for developing countries between now and 2030, regarding the environment, security, stability, employment, training and social protection model. Clearly, there are some elements of discourse and financial commitments, but these lack coherence and are inadequate in scope.

In particular, spending on peace and stability remains weak, as is, to a lesser extent, the amount allocated to “social justice”. However, these “strategic challenges” represent some of France’s strengths, as it has an undeniable expertise in certain areas—be it enhancing financial governance, mobilising tax resources, (public) education, protecting the environment or social protection. The 2030 agenda is very broadly progressive, and continental Europe, including France, has managed to integrate its priorities into this agenda concerning rights and access to essential freedoms and services. Yet, there is still much to be done when it comes to discourse or the choices of aid allocation.

7. FINDINGS ON THE WEAKNESSES AND CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS FOR ODA BY 2030

7.1. The weaknesses revealed by the national narratives

Our reading of the national narratives shows that the Addis Ababa Agreement on development financing arrangements and the consensus around the goals expressed by the SDGs mask profound differences between the donors when it comes to the justification and the hallmarks of their ODA. Some of these differences are inevitable. The very fact of stamping your hallmark means that you have to distinguish it from that of your neighbours. Besides, as the ODA is rooted in history as much if not more than in economic rationality, the motives, priorities and choices of allocation cannot be expected to be similar across countries. Nonetheless, both the ways of justifying aid and explaining its rationales, show more striking and explicit differences than we have thought. And although some convergences between goals and modalities can be observed—conflict management, poverty reduction, financing of global public goods—none of these bring the four donors together in such a way as to pave the way for remaining donors.

Were we to simplify the discourses and bring them closer together, we would end up with two narratives: one involves the United Kingdom and the BMGF, focused on absolute poverty in fragile States (though as seen in Section 4, the interventions of BMGF are not limited to this). Here, ODA represents a flow that has no short-term equivalent or, in other words, no possible substitute. The second, driven by continental Europe, foregrounds the various financial (loan, grants, guarantees) and non-financial cooperation contributions whose end goal is the construction of public policies crucial to managing globalisation. The case of Chinese assistance is apart and somewhat paradoxical: it serves a political ambition (the emancipation of former colonies) but its allocation does not seem to emanate from any centralised political strategy.

Aside from BMGF (and to some extent the UK), the conditions for successful ODA external to aid itself. By 2030, aid will be dependent on policies or initiatives that do not fall under the heading of ODA, as we know it today. This is the case of external policies (defence, provision of GPGs, trade, institutional reform to the UN and the IFIs, refugees and migrants), as well as domestic policies (agriculture, labour market, taxation), as Germany in particular highlights. Although this relationship has always existed to some degree, such dependency will grow because of the 2030 Agenda and the fragile nature of contemporary discourse on ODA.

These discourses contain a few blind spots that need enlightening. These include the role that funding (ODA and non-ODA) plays in achieving the targeted goals, the sustainability of this funding if subscribed as debt, and the public/private sharing of responsibilities, especially when it comes to sharing risk. These blind spots are a second factor of weakness in the discourses justifying ODA.

Finally, we add a further point to the previous ones, which unlike these has not been deduced from our analysis of the discourses. In fact, the method chosen to inform the justifications for ODA in this study gives an exclusive role to donors and sidelines what the recipient countries or “partners” themselves could produce on the matter. Aware of this bias, we believe that despite everything, the 2030 Agenda currently under discussion is an agenda of financial offerings. What holds for this Agenda as a whole also holds for its Parties, as shown by the discussions at the Habitat III Conference as these too were expressed exclusively through the vocabulary and prism of development
finance providers. This predominance of a discourse focusing on the “offering” stems from the accounting equation behind the Agenda’s stupendous financing needs—the trillions to be found at all costs—whose terms date back to the first work of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing. Vital to fixing the orders of magnitude, the estimations of aggregate needs have the disadvantage of hiding, for the moment, the emergence of national preferences and the South’s narratives on the subject. This is a third weakness in the discourses on ODA.

7.2. The conditions of success—an exploration

First point to be clarified: the 2030 Agenda feeds the narratives on the supply of financing, but are there also narratives dealing with demand? At this stage, debates on finance for development focus on the toolbox of instruments to be deployed in response to the need for substantial investment in developing countries. This call for the deployment of diversified instrument is mainly driven by the supply, i.e., the donors. What knowledge of the “needs” do they base their offer on? How to better take them into account? What are the different visions of long-term transformation among different actors of change—politicians, investors, think tanks? What “transformation” exactly does or should ODA finance from the recipient countries’ point of view?

Second point to be clarified: what can external financing achieve in the contexts of fragile States, poor governance and conflict, which will certainly remain major challenges in 2030? In these situations, what exactly can be expected from the concentration of aid? What conditions outside of ODA need to be present for ODA to reach its objectives? Do the OECD and DfID to be given priority advocate the “whole-of-government” approach?

Third point to be clarified: do the macroeconomics of the 2030 Agenda comply with the current rules governing indebtedness?

Developing countries have to reconcile a double objective: finance development spending and avoid a debt crisis. Are these two objectives compatible? Is the magnitude of the 2030’s Agenda financing needs compatible with the current rules of indebtedness and the measures of risks and dividends? Do the central banks and IFIs have a special role to play that they have not played so far? Should debt be more flexible for investments in sustainable development objectives? Alternative (or complementary) measures to contracting debt involve collecting tax revenue, migrants’ remittances, public-private partnerships—providing these are viable—and the reduction of illicit financial flows. Is the magnitude of the related needs, in line with the SDGs, known? What are the expected results of aid exactly?

Fourth point to be clarified: building global policies—after ODA, what comes next?

A number of global challenges—such as the target of keeping global warming down to 2°C or the fight against deepening inequalities—highlight that aid alone is far from sufficient for the achievement of the SDGs by 2030. Despite the many commitments to promoting policy coherence since the beginning of this century, the results have fallen short of expectations: for many years, there has been a clear division of labour within governments whereby the ministries in charge of international development defended the interests of developing countries, while the other ministries worked to promote national growth (Carbonne, 2012).

What are the reasons for the so far modest results of the donor’s efforts to improve policy coherence?

Aside from the coherence of current policies, what failings or shortcomings in current governance need to be acted on? The financial architecture? The global rules, so as to include provisions for taxation? In what way does ODA represent an asset, a promising experience, to “steer globalisation”? What pieces of the global governance puzzle need to be integrated into it so as to increase its impact?

If the conditions of success for the 2030 Agenda do not depend on aid, how can (or must) the responsibilities of aid organisations be transferred to actors working in other areas of public policy impacting developing countries?

Fifth point to be clarified: Innovating, learning and going to scale; following the success in the domain of health, what comes next? Is there current consensus on some of the SDG priorities—knowing that the universal and integrated character of the Agenda rules out any notion of priority? Does the remarkable success of some of the health MDGs suggest other specific SDGs for which a global approach would be effective?
REFERENCES


RF (2014). LOI n° 2014773 du 7 juillet 2014 d’orientation et de programmation relative à la politique de développement et de solidarité internationale


## APPENDIX

### Appendix 1 Table correlating the OECD sectors with France’s major challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11b. l.1.</th>
<th>Education, Total</th>
<th>Social justice</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120: I.2.</td>
<td>Health, Total</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
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<td>130: I.3.</td>
<td>Population policies/programmes and reproductive health, Total</td>
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<td>140: I.4.</td>
<td>Water and sanitation, Total</td>
<td>Global public goods</td>
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<tr>
<td>150: I.5.</td>
<td>Government and civil society, Total</td>
<td>Peace, stability, rule of law</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Employment policy and administrative management</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16030.</td>
<td>Housing policy and administrative management</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16040.</td>
<td>Low-cost housing</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16050.</td>
<td>Multisector aid for basic social services</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16061.</td>
<td>Culture and recreation</td>
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<td>16062.</td>
<td>Statistical capacity building</td>
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<td>16063.</td>
<td>Narcotics control</td>
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<td>23183.</td>
<td>Energy conservation and demand-side efficiency</td>
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<td>232:</td>
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