Blog post June 5th 2025

Bonn 2025 climate talks: Brazil’s first diplomatic test ahead of COP30

What should happen at the Bonn climate negotiations (15-26 June)1 to ensure COP30 becomes a major inflection point in the UN climate process? As Brazil is preparing to host COP30 in Belém (10-21 November)2, the Bonn 2025 talks offer a critical opportunity to lay the groundwork for a more transformational, implementation-focused phase of the Paris Climate Agreement. With trust in multilateral climate cooperation strained and increasingly adverse geopolitics, negotiators will need to rebuild confidence, define clear paths forward on the Global Goal on Adaptation, Just Transition, and the Global Stocktake, and shape the political vision for COP30. This blog post explores what is at stake—and what to watch for—in the upcoming negotiations.

This year’s Bonn climate negotiations are a crucial stepping stone toward making COP30 in Belém a true landmark in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement—a key milestone in the implementation of this international treaty, having completed its core rulebook and its very specific negotiating agenda. COP30 will need to respond to a new set of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), mid-way through the decisive decade of action (2020-2030) to keep temperature rise at 1.5ºC. It will have to do so in a specially difficult year, with major geopolitical challenges currently undermining multilateral efforts, especially those aimed at collectively addressing climate change. Significantly, this will be the first meeting following the United States' announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.3

Brazil is under scrutiny to deliver, and it is also well positioned to do so. President Lula has sought to position himself as a climate leader, enjoys trust from many emerging and developing countries, and is seen as a defender of multilateralism and a key player within the BRICS. With this credibility, Brazil is ramping up its diplomatic effort in the lead-up to COP30.

The Paris Agreement is under scrutiny too. From experienced UNFCCC negotiators to citizens, a meaningful reflection on what the Paris Agreement has made possible—and what it has not—over the past 10 years is needed to inform the necessary actions within and beyond the UNFCCC system for the future of climate cooperation. In this context, IDDRI will be developing a two-level diagnostic: a diagnostic of the agreement in relation to the expectations and criteria described in IDDRI's 2015 publications; and an inventory of the situation of countries in terms of ambition and climate policies. 

Acknowledging the climate of distrust generated from the last COP29 outcome—especially on the New Collective Quantified Goal on finance (NCQG), deemed insufficient by many developing countries (IDDRI, 2024)—the incoming presidency wants to rebuild trust, empathy, and solidarity, stating that “the credibility of our multilateral process is in the hands of negotiators in Bonn”.4

In recent years, negotiations in Bonn have faced persistent challenges, including prolonged disputes over the agenda and frequent deadlocks. In the current difficult geopolitical context, overcoming these procedural hurdles and rebuilding trust would constitute meaningful progress on many agenda items. If parties succeed in producing agreed text, it would represent a significant achievement beyond initial expectations.

Differently to other editions, the presidency wants the Bonn negotiations to start with a “day zero” of informal conversations on three items. First, the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators under the UAE–Belém Work Programme (IDDRI, 2024), likely to advance with fewer hurdles; second, the UAE Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake (GST) outcomes (IDDRI, 2024), which may encounter persistent challenges; and third, the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), emerging as a critical space for renewed attention and concrete proposals (IDDRI, 2024). Last but not least, Bonn needs to start planning for the content and format of COP30’s political outcome, including the response to NDCs (IDDRI, 2025) and seeds for necessary governance reforms.

Global Goal on Adaptation: concluding a technical process and ensuring political uptake

On adaptation, COP30 should mark the conclusion of the two-year UAE-Belem work programme on the indicators of the Global Goal on Adaptation. This would be the end of a multi-year process aiming at specifying this goal in order to facilitate the review of progress achieved, as mandated in article 7.14 of the Paris Agreement. At COP28 in Dubai, the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience was established to support the implementation of the goal, which resulted in this second work programme to develop indicators to monitor progress. Experts tasked with proposing a set of 100 indicators have developed a consolidated list of 490, based on the 11 thematic and dimensional targets of the GGA, but are facing difficulties to reduce it further. They are now waiting for further guidelines from the negotiators to be able to conclude their work. In particular, clearer directions on unsolved political  issues, for instance, the question on whether it should include indicators on the means of implementation, including financial ones, provided by Parties to support the adaptation efforts and their effectiveness is still divisive. 

The conclusion of this work programme will also be an opportunity to reaffirm the value of alternative approaches, especially for the consideration of qualitative information (mentioned in the GGA decision text, Decision 2/CMA.5), that can be developed at national scale for monitoring, evaluation and learning systems to feed in the indicators and bridge with subnational scales (). For an implementation-focused COP, creating incentives and processes that facilitate local engagement and local knowledge and learning systems is in itself a powerful sign. To achieve that, Bonn will need to create political buy-in for Parties’ uptake of the GGA and its indicators to make sure this irrigates national and subnational policies and connects to planning, implementation and evaluation processes.

Just Transition Work Programme: breaking the divide between different understandings of just transition

A key item that was postponed at COP29 is the JTWP. This was due to underlying tensions between developed and developing countries on their understanding of just transition. Developed countries' delegations primarily emphasize workforce transition, social rights, and inclusive participation as central priorities in just transition discussions. In contrast, developing nations advocate for a broader, more inclusive approach, rooted in the UNFCCC’s principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities,5 to achieve climate justice. This perspective calls for equity, not as a supplement to transition implementation, but as a requisite to enable action, in the context of various inequalities within and between countries. 

Disagreement also lies on the JTWP’s modalities (i.e. detailed procedures, methods, or arrangements) to continue the just transition discussions. During COP29, several parties called for the JTWP to produce more “concrete outcomes”. These calls were motivated by a variety of objectives, including a desire to expand the role and activities of the work programme, and wanting a more structured approach including clear timelines and outputs.6

One specific perspective that may help reconcile divides is having an international cooperation lens when looking at just transition—a topic the COP 30 Presidency has endorsed in the context of the Roadmap to Mission 1.5.7 A just transition must reflect each country’s unique context, balancing development priorities and sovereignty. However, it also needs to recognize the global interconnectedness of socio-economic and climate challenges, and therefore how multilateral cooperation is essential to align national actions with international commitments, manage cross-border impacts, and ensure equitable outcomes in the global transition.

UAE Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake: how to move from multilateral discussions to on-the-ground implementation? 

Parties will also resume discussions on the implementation of the GST, following COP29 where they had failed to reach agreement. As envisaged in the Paris Agreement, the outcome of the GST has to inform Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the enhancement of international cooperation. With the new round of NDCs being completed by COP30, the question will be how the GST outcome has been considered, a topic that will also be discussed in the official negotiations during the second Annual GST NDC dialogue.8

As NDCs development and implementation fall under national policymaking, and it is the first time that the Parties are assessing whether the GST has worked in terms of raising countries’ collective ambition, climate negotiators are facing challenges in defining the COP’s role in more ambitious implementation. Some view the outcome of the UAE dialogue as an opportunity to track progress towards the GST global targets and understand better countries’ individual contributions through NDCs; others see these outcomes as potentially infringing on national sovereignty. In either case, the implementation of the GST will need to find its way beyond the current dialogue, ensuring strong ties with key actors outside UNFCCC that can support implementation efforts.

Defining the key elements of COP30’s political outcome

In Bonn, the Presidency should also engage Parties in shaping the political outcome of COP30. This could take the form of a Leader’s declaration, a formal COP decision, elements of the Action Agenda—or a combination of all three. 

Key elements are emerging for that. First, COP30’ response to the collective effort, as estimated from the new NDCs, on the Paris Agreement temperature goals. This will have implications for the path forward on mitigation action and support, and for the capacity to adapt, anticipate and prepare for tipping points and systems collapse due to climate change—a matter discussed under the President’s Lula proposal for a ‘Climate Change Council’.9 Secondly, the political outcome can also take steps to strengthen the multilateral process and improve synergies with other international fora, like the other Rio conventions. Thirdly, it can also leverage the synergies between ambitious climate action and sustainable development (cf. Sustainable Development Goals within the 2030 Agenda)10, an opportunity to solidify the vision of resilience, shared prosperity and just transition. 

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